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What's in a Story:
An Approach to
Comprehension and Instruction
Stories are an integral part of the school curriculum and are used
widely in different content areas. As such, a primary objective of
educators should be to discover methods which would ensure that children
comprehend narratives as well and as accurately as possible. To deter-
mine whether children have acquired the appropriate comprehension skills,
teachers and reading educators have used five basic tasks that are
considered to be good indicators of narrative understanding. These tasks
include the following skills:
1. finding the main or the most important ideas in a narrative;
2. detecting or inferring cause and effect relationships among
events;
3. ordering narrative events in the correct temporal sequence;
4. making inferences from the information given in a text and
using this inferential information to make judgments about
the text;
5. paraphrasing or summarizing the events depicted in a narrative.
An additional and less frequently used indicator of narrative comprehension
is the child's ability to produce or write stories.
For the most part, explanations of how children learn these skills
have been understood at the intuitive, descriptive level, both in terms
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of the teacher's and reading educator's expertise. Consequently, certain
of these skills (see Steuer & Murphy, 1979, for an indication of some
of the current beliefs about how these tasks should be taught). Although
some of these beliefs are well founded, many have arisen from the paucity
of knowledge in the area of story comprehension, as well as from a lack
of consensus as to what constitutes good comprehension skills. Perhaps
with more systematic research on the comprehension process, our beliefs
can be altered or substantiated, and the instructional process improved.
During the past half-dozen years, there has been an upsurge of
interest, from a psychological point of view, in the investigation of
skills similar to those considered to be important in a school setting.
Although most of these psychological studies do not deal with particular
methods of instruction on how to comprehend a story, these studies do
indicate some of the more powerful factors that influence whether compre-
hension occurs and whether children construct coherence interpretations
of the stories they hear or read. By using the results from recent
studies, guidelines can be proposed for the development of instructional
procedures that insure a high rate of comprehension and learning.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an integration of current
research in story comprehension. First, a selective overview and summary
of the current approaches to story comprehension is given, highlighting
the most central concepts arising from several different perspectives on
story comprehension. Second, a review of the empirical research is in-
cluded, illustrating how recent advances in theory have enriched our
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knowledge of the comprehension skills of children, especially those in
the first years of elementary school. Third, some of the main conclusions
and issues in the area are discussed in terms of theoretical and empirical
advances and applications to school settings.
SCHEMA-THEORETIC APPROACHES
One promising approach to narrative comprehension has been the develop-
ment and expansion of a particular theoretical viewpoint, generally termed
"schema" theory. Recently, this orientation has become more widespread
in acceptance and has been used to interpret a variety of findings on
text comprehension. As a result, we feel that a short summary of the
origins and use of the term schemata will aid in the understanding of
current story research.
Origins of "Schema" Theory
The core components of "schema" theory are derived from Bartlett's
(1932) use of the term schemata and his interpretation of adults' memory
for narratives. The major finding Bartlett felt compelled to explain
when adults recalled stories was the lack of verbatim recall. Bartlett
was struck by the fact that story recall almost always included blendings
of information, inventions of new detail, temporal transformations, and
selective omissions of information. Because his findings did not support
the then popular trace-theoretic notions of memory (which assumed that
memory was like an exact "replica" of incoming information), Bartlett
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constructed a new framework arguing for the necessary role of "prior
experience" in one's memory for narrative information.
Bartlett felt that listeners or readers used their prior experience
or knowledge to construct "expectations" about what should occur in a
story. These expectations would influence how a text was remembered
because the reader or listener would continually interpret incoming in-
formation using what he or she already knew and expected. Bartlett
labeled these prior experiences "schemata," because he felt that this
concept captured the assumption that one's prior experience was highly
organized in structure and operation. In describing the role of
schemata in comprehension, Bartlett continually emphasized the inter-
active nature of schemata with the input, focusing on the integration
of new information with already existing knowledge. He argued that
there were instances when expectations would be so strong that a listener
would transform incoming information and construct a representation that
corresponded more to what was expected rather than to what had been read
or heard.
Bartlett's thinking has influenced current work through his refine-
ment and use of the concept of schemata, and because he operated within
a broad theoretical framework. Adhering to Bartlett's basic assumptions,
several investigators have attempted to extend his thinking by describing
various properties of schemata (Anderson, 1977, 1978; Rumelhart, 1975;
Thorndyke & Yekovitch, 1980; Winograd, 1977) and the structural organization
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of specific story schemata (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975;
Stein & Glenn, 1979; Thorndyke, 1977).
Properties and Functions of Schemata
The properties and functions of schemata are fairly well agreed upon
despite the variations in approaches to describing the structure of
narrative knowledge. Schemata are generally thought to be composed of
generic or abstract knowledge (Anderson, 1977, 1978; Kintsch & van Dijk,
1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Stein, 1979;
Stein & Glenn, 1979; Thorndyke & Yekovitch, 1980) and reflect the proto-
typical properties of various experiences encountered by an individual.
In the process of schema formation, an individual integrates over
many instances. The end product of this integration often includes
events, dimensions, or information that was not directly observed by
the individual. A schema also need not be open to consciousness by the
person using it and the formation may also proceed unconsciously
(Bransford & Franks, 1971; Bransford & Johnson, 1973; Bransford &
McCarrell, 1974). Although schemata are assumed to reflect an individual's
experience (and therefore could possibly reflect idiosyncratic knowledge)
these structures are assumed to be general and shared across individuals.
Once formed, they are thought to be relatively stable over time.
Schemata are assumed to be acquired and altered or changed by in-
duction from prior or ongoing experience. A story schema, for example,
is thought to be acquired from the listening to, the reading of, and the
What's in a Story
6
viewing of a variety of narratives, from direct instructional experience
in a school setting, and from one's personal participation in everyday
social interaction (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein, 1979; Stein & Glenn,
1979; Thorndyke & Yekovitch, 1980). Although most investigators are
intensely interested in the acquisition process, this is the one area
where the least is known. Most studies concentrate on the end product
of acquisition, rather than the process itself.
The organizations and structure of narrative schemata have been des-
cribed in a variety of ways. Central to nearly all the descriptions is
the notion of a sequence of events that are causally related (Schank &
Abelson, 1977; Warren, Nicholas, & Trabasso, 1979). An additional property
proposed by some investigators (Black & Bower, 1980; Mandler & Johnson,
1977; Rumelhart, 1977; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979)
is that schemata can be embedded in other schemata, creating a hierarchical
knowledge structure. An example of hierarchical embedding occurs in a
narrative schema when there is a superordinate goal, which can be broken
down into a series of subgoals necessary for the successful attainment
of the main goal. The achievement of each subgoal constitutes an episode
(or schema) which is embedded in the episode for attaining the higher
order goal.
Given these inherent properties of schemata, what functions do they
serve? Most of the current research on stories would be accurately des-
cribed as studying the influence of schematic knowledge on the retrieval
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or output of information (Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Mandler, 1978,
1979; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Nezworski, Stein, & Trabasso, Note 3;
Stein & Glenn, 1979, Stein & Nezworski, 1978; Thorndyke, 1977). In
other research on narrative comprehension, schemata are thought to guide
encoding, organization, representation, and retrieval of information. The
use of narrative schemata during the encoding process has been studied
directly by examining how children describe events in pictorial sequences
(Poulsen, Kintsch, Kintsch, & Premack, 1979; Asp, Johnson, & Trabasso,
Note 1; Day, Stein, Trabasso, & Shirey, Note 2).
Likewise, how a reader or listener uses schematic knowledge to
organize incoming information has been studied. In particular, schematic
knowledge has been shown to have a significant effect on the organization
of ambiguous or disorganized stories (Pichert & Anderson, 1977; Stein &
Nezworski, 1978). By varying the type of instructions given to subjects
before encoding, these studies have illustrated that the active use of
schemata can ensure better organization of a text (Stein & Nezworski,
1978), as well as the reorganization of ambiguous text information into
more coherent points of view (Pichert & Anderson, 1977).
In the process of encoding, representing, and retrieving narrative
knowledge, schemata are assumed to guide the comprehender in constructing
hypotheses about what types of information should occur in the text and
what type of logical connections should link the various events in a
narrative sequence. For example, narrative schemata specify the components
What's in a Story
8
of a story which should be included in a text, the temporal sequence of
the narrative events, and the type of causal relations which should
connect the events. By using schematic knowledge, the listener or reader
can determine whether certain parts of a story have been omitted and
whether the story events occur in a sequence corresponding to real-time
physical order. During the encoding and representation of a story,
missing events may be inferred to fill in theomitted information and
events may be reordered to correspond to a real-time sequence. In
retrieval, a schema functions in a similar manner. Encoded events are
selected for retelling or production according to the specification of
the particular schema being used.
Many studies (Mandler, 1978, 1979; Stein, 1979; Stein & Glenn, 1979;
Stein & Nezworski, 1978; Stein & Glenn, Note 4) have shown that the use
of schematic knowledge is so powerful that listeners have little control
over the types of retrieval strategies used during recall of narrative
information. Even when listeners are instructed to reproduce texts in
a verbatim form, they cannot do so when the text contains certain types
of omissions or certain sequences of events. Instead, a listener is
more likely to recall the text in an order which includes the types of
information specified by the story schema. In this sense, current
findings are congruent with many of Bartlett's original ideas.
While less studied as such, schemata can also be used as retrieval
plans during the production or generation of novel stories, facilitating
the organization and integration of existing but discrepant information
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in long-term memory. Similarly, schemata for other forms of discourse can
also influence the writing or production process. For example, rhetorical
or conventional argument forms can be used to construct new arguments,
conventional scientific formats can be used to write research reports
(Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) or rhetorical concept forms can be used to
generate texts necessary for the acquisition of a new concept. In using
any of these forms, the production process may be greatly facilitated if
the appropriate schemata have been acquired and can be used during re-
trieval.
Descriptions of Story Structures
Besides describing the functions and properties of schemata, recent
research on story comprehension has provided detailed descriptions of the
structure and content of story schemata, as well as a set of predictions
concerning the quality of comprehension. Several studies also contain
data directly related to the comprehensibility of narratives included
in basal reading series (Baker & Stein, 1981).
These results should be valuable to teachers and those constructing
basal readers because most teachers do not have the necessary time or
means to assess accurately a child's knowledge of narrative events. As
a result, teachers rely heavily on the material presented in a basal
reading series, and hope that reading companies have given serious atten-
tion to the issues of "readability" and "comprehensibility" of texts
for children at different reading levels.
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Most basal reading series, however, are not developed on the basis
of a well-formed theory of comprehension. Thus, comprehension of the
text material is not necessarily guaranteed. Many of these texts omit
lexical and semantic information necessary for accurate comprehension.
These omissions occur more frequently in texts for young elementary school
children, where the need for explicitness is even higher than for older
children (Fredericksen, Note 5).
Thus, the explication of the structure and content of story knowledge,
how this knowledge is used, as well as what happens to comprehension when
the text does not correspond to a child's knowledge will help writers of
curriculum material and teachers in the construction of methods to ensure
good comprehension. In the following sections, we provide a summary of
the recent structural and semantic descriptions of narrative knowledge.
A Simple Story Schema
Most investigators interested in story structures (Johnson & Mandler,
1980; Mandler, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1975; Stein,
1978, 1979; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Thorndyke, 1977; Thorndyke & Yekovitch,
1980) have argued that story knowledge is organized either in the form
of rewrite rules containing knowledge about the generic structure of
stories, or as goal-directed problem solving episodes (Black & Bower,
1979; Rumelhart, 1977). Although these approaches differ in emphasis,
the description of simple story episodes is highly similar. The episodic
schema can be described as a hierarchical network of story categories
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and logical relationships connecting these categories. Categories repre-
sent the different types of information that recur in most stories. The
logical relations connecting the categories specify the degree to which
information in one category influences the occurrences of events in sub-
sequent categories.
The initial division in the story structure consists of two parts:
the Setting category plus the Episode. The Episode is the basic higher-
order unit of analysis in a story and contains a sequence of five dif-
ferent categories. Each category contains specific types of information
and serves a different function in the schema. Table I contains a des-
cription of each of the categories in a simple narrative, the logical
relations connecting each category to the adjacent one, and an example
of a story broken down into each of the basic categories. The categories
described correspond to those used by Stein and Glenn (1979) and bear a
close resemblance to categories in other grammars cited above.
Insert Table 1 about here.
As Table I indicates, the story begins with the introduction of the
protagonist, and usually contains one or more statements about the physical,
social, or temporal environment in which the remainder of the story occurs.
The Setting is not considered a part of the Episode, as it is not usually
directly related to the subsequent sequence of events described in the
episode. However, the Setting information allows for interpretation of
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subsequent events. Thus, information in the Setting category may constrain
the possible events that can occur in the Episode.
The Episode consists of five different categories. The Initiating
Event, the category beginning the Episode, contains information that marks
some type of change in the protagonist's environment. Its major function
is to evoke a desire in the protagonist to achieve some sort of goal
(or change of state). The goal, included in the second category, Internal
Response, is the most critical part of the story, for it is proposed that
story knowledge is basically organized around the goal of a protagonist.
The Internal Response category not only contains the statement of a goal,
but it may also include an emotional reaction to the Initiating Event,
and thoughts or plans about how to achieve the goal. The primary function
of this category is to motivate the protagonist to carry out a set of
overt actions, defined as the Attempt category. The protagonist's Attempt
is representative of an internal plan of action which is externalized,
for the purpose of achieving his goal. The Attempt then results in the
Consequence, signifying whether or not the protagonist attained the
goal. The final category, Reaction, can include one of several types of
information: The character's emotional and cognitive responses to the
goal attainment, the events that occur as a direct result of having
attained a goal or, frequently, the Reaction can include a moral, sum-
marizing what the character may have learned from achieving a particular
goal, or admonishing the reader about the futility of attaining the goal
under consideration.
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In all of the recent descriptions of story structures, it is evident
that each category in an episode could directly cause the occurrence of
the subsequent category. One exception to a direct causal chain concerns
the relationship between the Attempt and Consequence. It has been pro-
posed (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979) that the protagonist's
actions can directly cause the Consequence to occur. However, in some
stories, the Attempt may merely "enable" the occurrence of the Consequence.
For example, in a story used by both Mandler and Johnson (1977) and Stein
and Glenn (1979), the protagonist, Epaminondas, agrees to carry a cake
to his grandmother's house (an Internal Response-goal). He wraps it
in a leaf (Attempt), puts it under his arm (Attempt), carries it to his
grandmother's (Attempt), and when he arrives (Consequence), the cake is
all crumbled (Consequence). Here, the acts of wrapping the cake in a
leaf and carrying the cake underneath the arm may have physically re-
sulted in the cake crumbling. In other stories, however, the relation-
ship may be less direct. The Attempt may set up the necessary preconditions,
but not directly cause the Consequence. As an illustration, consider
a fox who wanted to catch a chicken for supper (Internal Response-goal).
The fox went to a hen house (Attempt), set a trap for the chicken
(Attempt), and then waited for the chicken to fall into the trap (Attempt).
Independent of what happened at the end of this story, the fox's Attempt
did not directly cause the Consequence. Rather, it established the pre-
conditions for the occurrence of the Consequence. Although there are
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variations in the relations linking the Attempt and Consequence, the organi-
zation of story events is, for the most part, assumed to be causally con-
strained. As a result of the causal chaining, certain types of informa-
tion must be included in a story, and must occur in a temporal sequence
that corresponds to the real-time order of events.
It should be emphasized that these descriptions of stories refer to
the reader's or listener's story knowledge, and not to the structure of
stories that exist in texts. This point is important because the struc-
ture of texts may not correspond to the proposed internal organization
of story knowledge. For example, Internal Responses and Reactions are
often deleted from the text structure of an episode and must be inferred.
At other times, the text begins with the character's Internal Response,
and may not include an Initiating Event. We assume, however, that
although these categories are omitted from the text strucutre, they are
inferred and are included in the underlying representation of the story
in memory.
We emphasize the difference between the text structure and the
underlying cognitive structure, created by the reader or listener because
not only do category omissions occur in many texts but temporal inversions
also occur. Some investigators (Black & Wilensky, 1979; de Beaugrande &
Colby, 1979) have assumed that inversions or deletions in a text sequence
are representative of the organization of the underlying cognitive struc-
ture of stories. However, these transformations are rarely found in
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story recall, production, or recognition. Under most conditions, the story
teller, listener, or reader constructs a representation of events corres-
ponding to the real-time order of occurrence rather than to the narrative
time sequence.
In order to account for the few instances where omissions and in-
versions of information do occur in story recall, a small set of trans-
formational rules have been proposed for recall. These rules are used
to transform information as it is retrieved from long term memory and
communicated in either an oral or written mode. For example, children
often recall or tell their own stories without directly stating the
emotional responses or major goal of the protagonist (Mandler & Johnson,
1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979; Glenn & Stein, Note 6). Yet, from every
other indication, it is clear that the protagonist's behavior in the
story is purposeful and intended to achieve a certain outcome. The use
of a transformational rule would include telling a story without the
inclusion of certain core categories. We would argue that these children
have chosen to use a deletion rule and have assumed that the intentions
of the protagonist can be inferred from other events in the story.
The possible transformation rules used during retrieval have been
discussed in detail by Johnson and Mandler (1980) and Stein (1979).
Johnson and Mandler describe the formal properties of these rules. The
primary function of the rules is to reduce the redundancy in a message,
and to enable more efficient processing of information. The rules are
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similar to van Dijk and Kintsch's (1978) macrostructure rules and Grice's
(1975) conversational postulates. Gricean postulates, however, are more
general. They pertain to the conventions used to ensure the comprehensi-
bility of a message, as well as to increase the efficiency of information
retrieval.
Complex Story Schemata
Up to this point, we have discussed the organization of only a simple
one-episode story: Those narratives with only one protagonist who is
presented with a problem to solve, formulates a goal, constructs a plan,
turns it into an overt attempt, and either attains or does not attain
the goal. One difficulty is that many stories are concerned with the
resolution of problems involving other characters, thereby increasing the
complexity of the story structure. If stories correspond to our knowl-
edge of everyday social interaction, they would contain information about
the various problems that people solve in the course of social inter-
change. For example, achievement of most social goals is usually
impeded by an obstacle in the path of the protagonist either from a physical
or interpersonal source. Thus, it becomes important to characterize the
type of goal structures and obstacles that may be incorporated into an
individual's story schema (Stein & Goldman, in press). Several attempts
(Bruce & Newman, 1978; Goldman, in press; Stein & Goldman, in press;
Glenn & Stein, Note 6; Stein, Trabasso, & Garfin, Note 7; Wilensky, Note 8)
have been made to describe these components of story structure.
What's in a Story
17
One of the first steps in describing the goal structure of a story
is to determine the individual or interactive nature of the goal state to
be attained. Depending upon the nature of the goal, different decisions
must be made about the possible plans to attain the goal. For example,
the goal of the protagonist may be non-interactive, but the protagonist
must still consider the necessary preconditions that must be met in
order to attain this goal. Obstacles in the form of the environment,
the protagonist's own priorities, and the goals of others can develop
and prevent successful goal attainment. If the goal of the protagonist
is interactive and concerns other characters (e.g., concerns another
individual), the protagonist must determine how the other individual's
goals are going to interact with his. Two types of goal structures are
possible, namely, a conflict where the goals of the protagonist and a
second character are mutually exclusive, and a cooperation situation
where the goals of the protagonist and another character are in agree-
ment with one another.
As an example, suppose a protagonist desires an end state that will
be of self-benefit, but in order to achieve her desired goal, she must
rely on the cooperation of another person. In this situation, an indi-
vidual goal is the end target, but the attainment depends upon the success
of the protagonist in interacting with another person. Often, the pro-
tagonist does not succeed in ensuring cooperation from a second character
because the second character's goals are in direct conflict with the
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protagonist's goals. The protagonist has at least three options: (a) she
can use techniques to get the second character to abandon his goal, and
adopt one more in synchrony with her own; (b) she can attempt to generate
another plan, not involving the cooperation of the second protagonist;
(c) she can abandon her goal, and possibly substitute another.
Although this analysis does not exhaust all of the possible ways in
which a story sequence progresses, it does impart the flavor of several
recent analyses of more complex stories (Goldman, in press; Stein &
Goldman, in press; Wilensky, Note 8). These descriptions of goal struc-
tures are somewhat similar to those offered by Lewin (1931, 1935, 1936,
1948) in his field theory approach to adolescence, describing the life-
space of an individual.
The heart of recent descriptions includes plans that are constructed
to overcome obstacles or to meet specific preconditions necessary for
attaining a goal. For example, after deciding upon a goal, the protagonist
often generates a plan to obtain a goal, entailing knowledge about a set
of actions that would meet the preconditions for attainment of the goal.
Failure occurs when the standard preconditions change, or when new pre-
conditions must be met. As an example, suppose a story began by intro-
ducing a little girl who feels very lonely because she has nobody to play
with, so she decides that she wants to get a puppy dog. She thinks about
how she is going to accomplish this task and decides upon a plan. First,
she will go and ask her mother if she can get one. If the mother says
yes, then she will go to the store and pick out the one she wants, then
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she will bring it home. Goldman (in press) has shown that children's plans
to obtain certain goals correspond to sequences of this sort with older
children adding more standard preconditions in their initial goal plan
than do younger children.
Stories such as folktales, however, usually contain obstacles so that
some of the preconditions necessary for goal attainment cannot be met.
For example, one precondition important for goal attainment of a puppy
concerns the permission of a parent. Suppose the parent denies per-
mission. In order to obtain the goal, a new plan must be generated to
overcome this obstacle. This situation corresponds to our description
of the alternatives available when the protagonist has to secure the
cooperation of others. In the above example, cooperation is refused,
most likely because the parent's goals are in conflict with those of
the child. The little girl has several alternatives. She can attempt
to bring the parent's goal in line with her own, possibly by determining
why the parent objects, and then meeting those objections. Alternatively,
she could buy a puppy, and convince one of her friends to keep it, thereby
circumventing parental objection. Possibly, she might decide to substi-
tute another goal to assuage her present state of loneliness.
A tree diagram is an excellent aid for mapping out the progression
of steps necessary to pursue the different alternatives. Although choices
of alternative paths do vary in stories with each type of goal structure,
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some paths or solutions occur more frequently than others. Analysis of
plot themes (Levi-Strauss, 1955) shows that goal structures are con-
strained both by the social acceptability of values and by the experience
of the story teller.
The story grammars (Johnson & Mandler, 1980; Mandler & Johnson, 1977;
Stein & Glenn, 1979; Thorndyke, 1977) can also account for structural
variation in multiple-episode stories containing more than one protagonist.
As illustrated previously, each episode in a story contains one goal
plus an attempt and a resolution through goal attainment. The grammars
specify the way in which multiple-goal-based stories are structured by
describing the permissible ways in which an individual episode can be
linked to another episode in a story. These rules are an attempt to
illustrate how various goal structures of one or more characters can
be logically related to one another. We illustrate these rules with
the following descriptions.
In the existing grammars, any two episodes in a story structure can
be connected by one of three relationships: And, Then, or Cause. The
And relation describes an episode structure where two episodes occur in
a temporal sequence, according to narrative time, but where the episodes
may have occurred in any order, or may have occurred simultaneously in
real time. For example, many stories relate how two characters desire
to pursue the same goal, e.g., a good, kind knight wants the hand of a
beautiful princess, and an evil, villainous knight desires the same.
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In the beginning of the story, a description containing two episodes may
be given, explaining why each knight desires the hand of the princess,
showing the plan of each knight to attain his goal, and relating the
initial attempt to each one to win the princess. These two episodes
occur in a sequence in the story line, but there is no a priori reason
to believe that one episode occurred before another. In fact, many of
the rhetorical markers in the story (e.g., meanwhile, at the same time,
etc.) allow the reader to infer that the two episodes were occurring
simultaneously. After the two episodes occur, each is usually related
to a third episode by a Then relationship.
The Then relationship is used when one episode follows another and
is meant to convey two types of logical relationships. The first is
where one episode sets up the necessary preconditions for a second epi-
sode to occur, but does not directly cause the second to occur. The
second usage of the Then relation is where one episode occurs before
another but has no causal relation to the second. An example of the
properties of the Then relation is where the good knight goes on a quest
to prove his valor and worth. After an episode in which he succeeds in
his quest, he can now present himself to the king as a person worthy of
of the princess. The episode in which he seeks and obtains his quest
does not directly cause him to present himself to the king, for he might
have chosen an alternative course of action to prove his courage. How-
ever, the events in the first episode set up the necessary preconditions
for the goal and attempt to be accomplished in the subsequent episode.
What's in a Story
22
As an example of the strictly temporal properties of the Then rela-
tion, consider the following sequence. Suppose the knight had to perform
two unrelated quests, and that these could be done in any order. In
the first episode, he obtains a golden fleece and in a second episode
a golden egg. The success of the first episode neither causes nor enables
the occurrence of the second episode. However, the two episodes do
occur in a temporal succession.
The third type of connection, the Cause relation, implies a direct
connection between two episodes such that the first episode directly
ensures the occurrence of the second episode. Certain problems arise in
deciding whether episodes are connected by the Then or Cause relation,
because the perception of a direct causal link depends upon the compre-
hender's knowledge about the events in the story. If more than one
alternative episode can be generated after the occurrence of the first
episode, the connection between the two episodes might be a Then relation.
However, if the subject perceives that only one type of episode could
result as a function of a previous episode, then the connection between
the two episodes is likely to be a Cause relation. The types of relations
connecting two episodes are strictly dependent upon the inferences made
by a reader during the process of organizing the story information. The
decision about the type of relationship connecting two episodes remains
at an intuitive level, taking into account our naive notions of physical
and psychological causality including notions of multiple, sufficient,
and necessary causes.
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Johnson and Mandler (1980) add an additional constraint to the
identification of causally related episodes, stating that one episode must
be embedded in another for a Cause relation to connect two episodes.
Episode embedding occurs when a second episode begins before a first
episode has ended. In the Johnson and Mandler grammar, a second episode
can be embedded in a first episode in one of three locations: the
beginning, the development or the ending. These structures are similar
to Rumelhart's (1977), where he describes the organization of complex
stori es.
As an example of an embedded episode structure, we have modified part
of a story used by Stein and Glenn (1979). The particular story, Judy's
Birthday, contains an embedded episode, occurring when the protagonist
needs the cooperation of a second person to attain her goal:
Judy is ten years old.
She is going to have a birthday,
and she wants a hammer and saw for presents. Episode 1
Then she could make a coat rack
and fix her doll house.
She asked her father for them. Episode 1 & 2
But her father did not want to get them for her,
although he did want to get her something.
So, he went out
and bought a beautiful new dress,
and gave it to Judy.
Judy was pleased but was sad that Episode 2 & 1
she didn't get the hammer and saw.
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The information up until and including Judy asking her father for the
hammer and saw comprise the first episode, and includes information cate-
gorized into the Initiating Event, Internal Response, and Attempt
categories. The consequence of the episode, however, is dependent upon
the response from Judy's father, comprising the second episode. The
second episode statements serve dual functions. For example, the act of
Judy asking her father is an Attempt from Judy's point of view, but
serves as the Initiating Event from the father's viewpoint because it
forces him to formulate a goal. The consequence of the father's episode
also serves as the consequence for Judy. Judy's reaction completes the
embedded episode. Thus, the criterion for judging whether or not an
episode is embedded in another is that one or more statements in one
episode must also be part of a second episode.
The type of logical relationships linking episodes and the number of
episodes in a story are thought to have significant effects on the compre-
hensibility of a story. Both Mandler and Johnson (1977) and Stein and
Glenn (1979) have proposed that stories consisting of episodes linked by
the Cause relation will be remembered better than episodes linked by
either the And or Then relation. Presumably, causal relations can either
be deduced logically or are known, whereas no a priori logical basis
exists for And or Then relations. This prior knowledge leads to a greater
likelihood of events being connected and thereby linked in a memory rep-
resentation. Further, an analysis of stories with different types of
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episodic relations reveals that episodes connected by the Cause relation
often correspond more closely to the way in which social knowledge has
already been organized by a listener. For example, episodes connected
by the Cause relation often include a situation where a protagonist
attempts to attain a goal, fails because one or more preconditions have
not been met, and must generate a new plan to attain the goal. Although
goal plans are often novel, knowledge about the important preconditions
is already known, and thought to be stored in close association with the
goal (Sacerdoti, 1977). Knowledge about the appropriate preconditions
necessary to satisfy a goal probably serves as an organizing device in
the retrieval or generation of plans to obtain the goal.
In stories where episodes are connected by the Then relation, the
goals and resolutions between the episodes may not be as tightly organized
as information between causally related episodes. For example, in several
stories generated by children between the ages of 5 and 12 (Glenn & Stein,
Note 6; Stein, Note 9) in the first episode, the protagonist formulates
a goal and attains it; then he goes on to formulate and resolve a dif-
ferent goal sequence, etc. The individual episodes in these stories,
although cohesive and purposeful within each episode, appear to be separate
entities, even when one episode may enable the occurrence of a second
episode.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
In this section, we will review the current literature on story compre-
hension as it relates to performance on tasks similar to those used in a
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school setting. Three broad questions aid in organizing the data to be
discussed: (1) What are the conditions under which children can detect,
comprehend, and recall events that are causally related in a story?
(2) What types of information are remembered and recalled in narratives?
and (3) What information in a story is central or important? To answer
these questions, we use data from the story comprehension literature, as
well as studies focusing on more broadly based developmental questions.
Detection and Comprehension of Causal Relationships
Understanding a text involves interpreting specific events and making
sense of the logical relations that connect those events. In the text,
explicit markers or rhetorical devices can be used to specify the relation-
ship between the two events, but for the most part, the causal relations
linking events must be inferred from the temporal order of events and from
prior knowledge about the text events. If the reader is not able to make
text connecting inferences during the process of encoding, then the text
will not be well understood or remembered (Stein & Nezworski, 1978).
The conditions and processes that influence inferential thinking are
not fully understood. We do know that a reader's previous experience with
stories and social situations play an essential role. A reader must rely
on knowledge of the incoming text events, and impose some type of organi-
zation on them. If the reader has no prior knowledge of specific story
events and their relationships, it is unlikely that the story sequence
will be comprehended.
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Assessing a child's prior knowledge of a text becomes an essential
requirement for determining whether or not the child has the capability
for accurate comprehension. If prior experience or familiarity with the
story material is not controlled, children may perform poorly, leading
to the conclusion that they lack the prerequisite cognitive operations
(piaget, 1923/1960) or monitoring skills (Markman, 1979). As we shall
see, it seems to have been easier to infer that young children are not
capable of performing certain tasks, rather than determining what it is
that young children know and/or can do. (See Brown, 1978; Bullock &
Gelman, 1979; and Gelman, 1978 for excellent reviews and suggested
alternatives for avoiding such problems.)
If knowledge or familiarity is controlled, however, a different
picture of children's skills begins to emerge. In this review, we attempt
to establish the minimal age at which young children have consistently
performed accurately on tasks requiring the detection of cause-effect
relations. We then attempt to illustrate where developmental differences
have been found, and what instructional techniques can be used to maxi-
mize a child's understanding of a task.
Memory for Event Order
Piaget (1923/1960) and Fraisse (1963) are primarily responsible for
much of the recent interest in children's sensitivity to the causal struc-
ture of narrative events. Piaget (1923/1960) was among the first to
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emphasize the importance of causal relations in assessing story communi-
cation and comprehension. Similar to Bartlett (1932), Piaget understood
that comprehension depended upon the ability of a child to understand
events in relation to other events, not only their temporal relationships
but the probabilities of one event occurring given the occurrence of a
prior event.
Both Piaget (1923/1960) and Fraisse (1963) were convinced, however,
that children in the pre-operational state of intellectual development
did not have the skill or capacity to make use of causal relationships
that could be inferred from a text. Piaget reported that in retelling
stories, children frequently mixed up the order of events, and appeared
not to be concerned or aware of the causal connections between them. But
Piaget's explanations are difficult to interpret. On the one hand, he
refers to the young child's inability to understand or to infer the
correct sequence of events as the real problem. On the other hand, he
refers to the young child's lack of communication skills as the primary
source of difficulty.
In an effort to clarify Piaget's hypothesis, Brown and her colleagues
carried out an extensive series of studies investigating children's memory
for ordered sequences of events (see Brown, 1976, for a complete review of
this work). She found that preschoolers were able to reconstruct accurately
a series of ordered pictures with few or no errors in their sequence. In
fact, when she presented these "ordered" events in a random sequence,
What's in a Story
29
young children made significantly more errors, and often attempted to re-
construct the sequence so that it would correspond to the ordered sequence
rather than to the random event sequence. These results suggest that
preschool children could not only remember an ordered series of events,
but were dependent on events occurring in a specific order so that they
could maximize the chances of understanding their logical relations. When
Brown assessed children's skill at recalling the correct order of events,
however, her results were more similar to Piaget's. She found that
children made several ordering errors while attempting to remember
certain narrative sequences. Brown attributed this difficulty to the
young child's lack of expository skills rather than to an inability in
remembering the correct event order.
Data from recent studies (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein & Glenn,
1979; Day, et al., Note 2; Nezworski, et al., Note 3), however, show that
children as young as 4 can recall the correct order of story events, pro-
vided the sequence corresponds to the "expected" causal order as described
by the rewrite rules of the story grammars. Mandler and Johnson (1977)
and Stein and Glenn (1979) suggest that one reason for the contradictory
results found in young children's story recall might pertain to the con-
tent and structure of the stimulus material used in the studies. While
all of the recent story studies controlled the content of the stories,
with regard to the inclusion of specific types of information and a strict
causal sequence, Mandler and Johnson (1977) and Stein (1979) have both
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suggested that story materials used by Brown and by Piaget may not have
corresponded to the logical category structure of available story knowl-
edge, and thereby presented the children with a more difficult task to
understand and recall.
After analyzing Piaget's stimulus materials, we found that children
were indeed presented with stories that were not well-formed. To illus-
trate his claims, Piaget relied upon several stories, one of which,
Niobe, is shown in Table 2. Several omissions and an inversion exist in
Insert Table 2 about here.
this tale. First, it is unclear as to exactly what motivates the lady's
action to laugh at the fairy. The text specifically states the reason
as being that the fairy had only one boy. However, states of possession
do not directly cause an action. A goal or plan does. It would have
been necessary for Piaget to include information as to why the fact of
having only one son would cause a lady to scorn the fairy. Furthermore,
the story contains two inverted events, 6 and 7. Although these state-
ments are connected by a because relation, they are still inverted.
One could surmise that a 7-year-old child would argue that the story
contained even more deletions than we have indicated. The surprising
result, however, is that upon reanalysis of Piaget's data for this story
we found only one temporal ordering error in all of Piaget's own data.
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The average correlation between the order of events presented and the order
in which they were recalled is .98. Most of the children deleted the
inverted information from their recall or included only one of the in-
verted statements. There were elaborations occurring in recall, with
most of the new information pertaining to omitted goals or goal state-
ments. However, Piaget's children did not make many temporal ordering
errors.
In a second story, Epaminondas, no data were presented by Piaget.
The structure of this text corresponds most closely to what has been de-
fined as a "well-formed" story. In both the Mandler and Johnson (1977)
and Stein and Glenn (1979) studies, where a modified version of this
story was used, there were very few temporal ordering errors. In the
Stein and Glenn study, the average correlation between presentation and
recall orders was .92 for first grade children and .98 for fifth grade
children.
The contradiction between Piaget's claims and recent studies is
solved. There is no contradiction. The 4-, 6-, and 7-year-old children
in Piaget's study had little difficulty in recalling the original,
temporal order of events, even when the text structure did not correspond
identically to the canonical form described by the grammars. Children
as young as 4 years have also been able to recall the exact order of
"well-formed" stories (Day, et al., Note 6). We would not be surprised
if it were discovered that 3- to 4-year-olds could also recall the
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temporal sequence of narrative events, since these preschool children can
identify the correct temporal order of events in a recognition task
(Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Kun, 1978) and can generate their own stories
according to real-time order (Pitcher & Prelinger, 1963).
Construction and Generation of Event Order
Teachers are often surprised that young elementary school children
seem to have little or no difficulty recalling the correct order of story
events, because the same children often experience difficulty when asked
to order a series of events that appear in their basal reader workbooks.
Several factors may be responsible. The primary one is that basal readers
rarely specify exactly what is meant by the correct temporal sequence.
Often, these texts include sequences, not ordered according to "real-
time," but arranged in a coherent narrative order, where the ending
occurs before the rest of the episode.
McClure, Mason, and Barnitz (1979) illustrate what happens when
children are asked to order story sequences found in basal reading books.
The purpose of the experiment was to determine how well the initial
sentence in a story oriented the child to the "correct" story sequence.
They constructed three different versions of a six sentence story. In
one, the conclusion occurred first in the sequence; in another, the
sequence began with a question about whether or not a goal of the pro-
tagonist would be achieved; the third began with the normal setting in-
formation, and adhered to the real-time order of events. The remaining
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sentences in the story were scrambled. Children from the third-, sixth-,
and ninth-grade were asked to re-order the events so that the event
order corresponded to the "correct sequence." Table 3 includes one
example each of a conclusion and setting version from the McClure et al.
study.
Insert Table 3 about here.
These investigators found that children's ability to order all
sequences improved with age, but that the difficulty in constructing the
correct order of events depended upon the type of sequence presented.
Third-graders had an extremely difficult time with the question and con-
clusion versions. However, they were fairly successful in constructing
an accurate order of the setting version, which corresponds to the
canonical order of events specified by the story grammars. Sixth- and
ninth-graders were significantly better at ordering sequences that did
not correspond to the canonical order. All of the older children, how-
ever, still performed better on the setting version than on the conclusion
and question versions.
These data indicate that children are significantly influenced by
knowledge of the real-time occurrence of an event sequence, and that they
use this knowledge to help construct a representation of the sequence in
the text. Furthermore, the results indicate that children's expectations
about the real-time order of events overrides other text information such
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as pronominal reference, time and contrastive markers, and other such co-
hesive devices that would permit alternative orders of event sequences.
Only older children begin to use cues such as pronominal reference, tense
change, and ellipsis, to construct alternative orders of the event
sequence. Thus, many of the errors made on this type of ordering task
can be said to be caused by children's prior expectations about what the
correct order of an event sequence should be.
The more difficult set of data to explain is the third-graders'
difficulties with the setting version. Although these children performed
satisfactorily on the setting version, McClure et al. (1979) reported
that they had some difficulty constructing the correct temporal order
of events; this substantiates teachers' beliefs about children's lack
of skill on this task. This result is puzzling in view of the young
child's excellent ability to recall the correct temporal order of events
in a story. However, Stein (1979) also found more errors than expected
in a story construction task similar to that used by McClure et al. and
concluded that young children's constructions of story order may not
totally correspond to real-time order for several reasons.
First, the memory demands involved in reconstructing a sequence of
several lines may account for the variability in some of the orders pro-
duced during reconstruction. Young children may not be able to attend
to all of the various connections that must be inferred in order to work
out a sequence of events. Under conditions where working memory is
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taxed, young children operate upon a smaller number of units in the
sequence and work out the logical relations only within the smaller unit
(cf. Kintsch & Vipond, 1979). By using this strategy, children would
attend to some, but not all of the possible causal connections that can
link the events. The resulting memory representation would include
fewer events and passive disorders since not all connections were taken
into account.
Another plausible reason for ordering errors lies in children's use
of transformational rules. Inversions consistently occur when children
order emotional reactions and events, or goals and attempts. For example,
in Stein's (1979) study, many children construct this ordering of a story:
(1) Suddenly Albert was pulled through the water into a boat.
(2) Albert felt sad.
(3) Albert wished he had been more careful.
(4) Albert had been caught by a fisherman.
However, the correct real-time order is 1, 4, 2, 3. The inversion of in-
ternal response and emotional reaction with actions indicates that children
may indeed accept inverted order information as being part of a "good"
story if two events are tightly (causally) connected to one another.
These "errors" suggest that children use the because relation to link
events, even when attempting to construct a predominantly forward-going
sequence of events.
A third reason for variation in children's ordering strategies is that
other possible real-time orders do exist. As we stated previously,
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inferences made about event order are dependent upon previous knowledge
of real world events. There are several ways in which events can be con-
nected, depending upon a child's previous experience, and the type of
information made during the comprehension process. Mandler and Stein
(1977) illustrate how this can occur.
On one of the subtests of the WISC intelligence test, a series of
pictured events are displayed and children are asked to construct the
"correct" order of the picture sequence. For example, the correct order
of a possible sequence might be: a man stealing some goods from a store,
the man facing a judge in the courtroom, supposedly being sentenced for
his crime, and the man being put into jail. Mandler and Stein point
out, however, that one error that can occur in this type of sequence is
putting the jail scene before the trial. In reality, the events may have
occurred in this order: stealing, going to jail, participating in a
courtroom hearing, and then being put on probation. Thus, different
inferences about the relationships connecting events can be easily made
which correspond to real-life experience. In fact, recent versions of
the WISC subtest allow more than one order to be accepted as correct.
The same kind of reasoning may be applied to the orders found by Brown
(1976), and McClure, et al. (1979) who used pictorial or verbal narra-
tives. There is a need for studies on the issue of order of events to
take into account possible, plausible orders based upon reality and not
restricted to one order.
Pages 37 & 38 missing from the bound original
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moral reasoning. He argued that young children do not consider intentions
in making judgments about the moral worth of a story character.
Second, Flapan proposed that there was a developmental sequence
underlying the inferences children make about film characters. Children
infer intentions before feelings, and feelings before interpersonal per-
ception (e.g., one character's awareness of another character). In
support of this hypothesis, Flapan cited Gollin (1958) who argued that
the use of inference in interpreting observed behavior is a relatively
late developmental phenomenoQn. Flapan, however, was cautious about
completely adopting GoIlin's viewpoint, as she found some evidence for
inferential skills among 6- and 7-year-olds. Since Flapan's (1968)
initial study, the field of narrative comprehension has progressed
rapidly, broadening our knowledge of children's inferential skills.
Reviews of current work, using written and oral stories, as well as films,
appear in Baker and Stein (1981), Grueneich and Trabasso (in press),
and Stein and Goldman (in press).
The first issue addressed in current work is the young child's
ability to infer the internal states of characters, and the causes of
other events in narrative sequences. Stein and Glenn (1979) report
that 6-year-old children had little difficulty giving the appropriate
causes, when asked a series of "why" questions about each event pre-
sented in a narrative. Although Stein and Glenn found developmental
differences in answers to probe questions, the differences indicated that
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older children give more reasons for the occurrence of an event, rather
than giving different types of reasons, as Flapan had reported. Studies
subsequent to the Stein and Glenn (1979) investigation have included
similar types of tasks, and have shown that children as young as 4 are
able to infer the inten-ions and internal states of characters (Day,
et al., pece 2; Nezworski, ez al., Note 3; Stein, et al., Note 7).
The variable accounting for the Wfferences in the results of recent
studies as compared to Flapan's (1968) study or more recent television
studies (e.g., Collins, in press; Collins, Wallman, Keniston, & Westby,
1978) may concern the structure of the narrative sequence presented to
young children as well as the medium in which the events occur.
Typically, TV and film narratives are not presented in a logically
coherent structure but contain much irrelevant, distracting material
that interferes with making inferences. In the Stein and Glenn (1979)
study, as in the more recent story comprehension work, children are pre-
sented with materials that conformed to the notion of an expected
sequence, as described in recent story grammars. Thus, certain types
of information are included in a narrative sequence, adhering to criteria
for constructing a tightly organized causal sequence. Under these con-
ditions, children have little difficulty inferring appropriate intentions
and internal states of story characters.
The comprehension difficulties of children, reported by Flapan (1968)
and by Collins (in press), appear to be a function of the text structure
rather than children's ability to make accurate inferences about the
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internal states of narrative characters. Because no a priori structural
analyses have been completed on either Flapan's or Collins' films, we
cannot say with assurance what is the source of difficulty in children's
skill at drawing inferences. From the descriptions of the film sequences,
however, it becomes apparent that events which would ensure a tightly
organized text are often omitted (Collins, et al., 1978) creating a
fairly unstructured sequence.
A second difficulty with many television and written narratives is
that the intentions and goals of the characters are often ambiguous,
unclear, or must be inferred from other cues such as facial expressions,
voice tone, etc. These subtleties may prevent children from making
inferences about internal states (Grueneich & Trabasso, in press). Several
studies (Bransford & Johnson, 1973; Thorndyke, 1977) have shown that
adults have similar difficulties when the goals of the protagonist
cannot be inferred, or when the content of the story is ambiguous or
unfamiliar. For ease of comprehension, explicit statements about goals
and internal states are clearly desirable, especially for younger
children.
Making inferences during generation. While young children are capable
of making causal inferences when presented with an entire story (Stein &
Glenn, 1979), they are also very capable of generating appropriate in-
ferences when given only a single, focal event. That is, they need
little contextual support to generate appropriate causes and consequences
of narrative events. In an effort to illustrate this kind of skill at
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causal thinking, we carried out a series of studies (summarized in Trabasso,
Stein, & Johnson, Note 10) investigating generation ability.
In one study, children ranging in age from 5 to 10 years old were
asked to generate a response to each of several different types of events,
all of which could be classified into one of the categories described in
the Stein and Glenn (1979) grammar. Each event could be classified into
one of four types: actions, goals, cognitions, and states. Examples
are: Joe ran after the ball; Joe wanted a book; Joe forgot to run after
Tom; Joe was sad.
In collecting children's responses to these types of events, the
following constraints were used. In a control condition, the children
were asked to generate spontaneously the first thought that came to mind
and to make their response part of a story. Children were told that any
response was acceptable, and thus, they were not limited to generating
an antecedent or a consequence to the focal event.
In a second condition, children were presented with the same focal
events, except that a because was attached at the end of each of the
clauses. Children were asked to complete the clause as it would occur
in a story. For example, the children were given the clause,,"Joe wanted
to run after the ball because . . .," and were asked to complete the
clause. In a third condition, children were given the same events as
clauses with an and then attached to each clause. Again, the children
were asked to complete each clause as it would occur in a story.
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Our reasons for undertaking this study were two-fold. First, we
wanted to provide direct evidence that young children could not only
make causal inferences, but could also understand the relational term
because, and could easily differentiate antecedents from consequences.
As we previously stated, recent studies on children's causal inferences
(Kuhn & Phelps, 1976; Kun, 1978), even though showing that preschool
children understand causal relationships, suggest that they may not under-
stand how and when the relational term because is used. Some investiga-
tors have also implied that young children may have a difficult time
generating causes or differentiating them from consequences (Kuhn &
Phelps, 1976; Piaget, 1924-1928).
Our second goal was to test some assumptions underlying recent des-
criptions of story structures. From the description of an episode given
in the first part of this chapter, it is evident that certain types of
events are assumed to constrain subsequent events. For example, the
goal of a protagonist is preceded by an emotional response or an initiating
event (e.g., the reason for the formation of the goal) and is followed
by a plan of action on the part of the protagonist to attain the goal.
If children's knowledge of story events corresponds to the descriptions
in the grammars, their response to each type of stem should correspond
to those events that seem to be an appropriate cause or consequence for
each focal event. For example, the stem, "Joe ran after the ball,"
should elicit different responses in the antecedent condition than in
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the consequence condition. Given that the stem is an action performed by
a person, it could easily be classified as an attempt, according to the
Stein and Glenn (1979) grammar. In the because condition, the most
proximal antecedent response to this stem would be a goal. The most
proximal resultant response would be a consequence, where either an end
state or another action could be considered appropriate.
The results of the study can be summarized as follows. All the
children from 5 to 10 years of age had little difficulty in discriminating
causes from consequences. Events generated when the children were asked
to finish clauses in the antecedent condition were different from those
generated in the consequence condition. After imposing specific criteria
for judging whether responses proceeded in a forward to backward direction,
we found that even kindergarten children made very few errors in terms
of generating appropriate causal events (error rates were less than 4%).
There were instances where younger children did produce consequences
in response to clauses ending with because. However, similar types of
responses were also given by 10-year-olds. These types of responses are
consistent with two distinct meanings of because. The first and most
frequent usage refers to the antecedent cause of a focal event. The
second usage refers to the logical justification for a focal event.
Our data showed that justifications occurred in response to certain types
of events, particularly states or cognitions where a cause could not be
readily inferred. For example, when children were given the statement,
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"It was Sunday because .. .," most replied, "we went to church," illus-
trating the use of a subsequent event to justify logically the reasons
for the occurrence of the event. These results support Johnson's (1939)
contention that because may be interpreted as reasons, as well as causal
antecedents, for events.
Another set of results was obtained by analyzing the classes of
events generated for each of the different types of focal events. The
children generated classes of responses that corresponded closely to the
type of structural relationships proposed by story grammar in the des-
cription of an episode. That is, states (setting statements) preceded
and were followed most often by physical events that, in turn, preceded
and were followed by cognitions or goals that were followed by actions
that led to events that led to emotional states. These results indicate
the powerful role of prior (story) knowledge and causal expectations.
A Master's thesis by Surbey (Note 11) shows that 3- to 41-year-old
children can generate appropriate causal answers to specific events, such
as emotional or physical states. Surbey examined children's responses
to eight states: two physical states (sleepy, hungry), three positive or
mixed states (happy, excited, surprised), and three negative states
(sad, angry, afraid). Children were asked to generate either the cause
or the consequence of each state. The procedures used to collect the
data were somewhat different from those used in the Trabasso, et al.
(Note 10) causality study. In Surbey's experiment, children were presented
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with a picture of a girl or boy, and then told by an experimenter: "This
is a picture of Jenny (John for male pictures). One day, Jenny got very
sad. She was so sad that her mother and father could tell she was sad."
If children were in the cause condition, they were asked, "Why do you think
Jenny was so sad?" If they were in the consequence condition, the experi-
menter asked: "What does Jenny do when she is sad?"
The results showed that these very young children could accurately
discriminate both causes from consequences and positive from negative
emotional states. Discrimination was measured by the degree to which the
distribution of the types of answers correlated for causes and conse-
quences, etc. The near zero correlations indicated little similarity
in the kinds of answers given. For example, almost all reasons for
sadness referred to external events representing states of loss for the
child (e.g., she was sad because her mom and dad left). Reasons given
for happiness, however, most often contained statements concerning the
prevention of a negative state (e.g., he was happy because he didn't go
to sleep hungry), or statements referring to an external event where
the child was given some new possession (e.g., a birthday present).
In addition to the low correlation of responses given to positive
and negative emotional states, another interesting finding was that
children often had slightly more difficulty generating a result or con-
sequence of feeling happy than they did for negative states such as
sadness or fear. The data, rather than indicating children's lack of
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knowledge about positive states, may be interpreted as indicating that
happiness is perceived as an end state, or as a reaction to having attained
a particular goal. Negative emotions, on the other hand, appear to
motivate the initiation of action to obtain a goal. Since negative states
are undesirable, they may motivate goals of changing states. On the other
hand, positive states are desired as goals or end states. Thus, one may
expect and find negative emotional reactions occurring as internal res-
ponses early in stories and positive emotions occurring at the end, as
a reaction to goal attainment. The results of this study also correspond
closely to the older child's and adult's knowledge of emotional states
(Demos, 1974) with similar antecedents and consequences being given by
all age groups. Thus, at 3 years of age, much knowledge has already
been acquired about personal reactions to situations, especially with
respect to the causal events related to emotions.
Detection of Inconsistent Information
So far, we have discussed children's ability to make and generate
causal inferences. Another important domain in comprehension concerns
children's so-called "metacognitive" ability to monitor their own compre-
hension (Brown, 1978; Brown & DeLoache, 1978; Markman, 1979). In particular,
children's skill at detecting or recognizing logically inconsistent or
physically impossible events in text material is thought to be an indi-
cator of good comprehension. According to some investigators (Flavell,
1979; Markman, 1979), certain types of monitoring skills are thought not
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to emerge until late childhood, whereas other investigators have argued
that 21-year-olds have metacognitive skills (Clark, 1978; Slobin, 1978),
proposing that metacognitive skills are developmentally bound and more
dependent upon the type of task used to assess the skill (Brown, 1978;
Shatz, 1977).
In this section, we present some work by Markman, which shows the
difficulty experienced by elementary school children when comprehension
monitoring is assessed. We then include an analysis of her paradigm for
investigating children's knowledge of contradiction, and some of our data
on the recognition of inconsistent information in a text.
Markman's studies. The primary goal in Markman's (1979) studies
has been to investigate children's ability to spontaneously verbalize
their awareness of contradictory and inconsistent information within the
structure of the text. In one of her studies, third-, fifth-, and sixth-
grade children were presented with essays which included either explicit
contradictory information, or information representing an implied contra-
diction. An example of her materials from each condition is presented
in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 about here.
After an experimenter read an essay to each child, the child was asked
a series of probe questions to determine whether spontaneous recognition
of the contradiction occurred. An example of the probe questions used
we re:
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1. Experimenter talking to child: "That's it. That's the
information about fishes." (Experimenter pauses and waits
for child to spontaneously verbalize the contradictory infor-
mation included in the text).
2. What do you think?
3. Do you have any questions?
4. Did I forget to tell you anything?
5. Did everything make sense?
6. Can you tell me everything you learned about fishes?
7. Tell me what the essay was about.
After question 7 was asked, more direct probe questions were initiated
inquiring whether children accurately remembered the facts in the text,
and whether or not the text made sense to them. Markman found that even
the oldest age group (sixth graders) had a low success rate for spon-
taneously verbalizing the presence of contradictory information. Over
half of these children failed to recognize the presence of contradictory
information by question 7. Performance in the implicit condition was even
worse, with the oldest children spontaneously verbalizing contradictory
information only a fraction of the time.
Markman argued that the failure to "recognize" inconsistent infor-
mation was not caused by a memory or inferential failure, for when
children were probed about factual material (probes initiated after
question 7) they had little difficulty providing the relevant information.
When asked to draw the relevant inferences, they could do so. She
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concluded that children were genuinely unaware that they had failed to
comprehend the material, and discussed her results within a framework
supporting the gradual acquisition of appropriate cognitive monitoring
ski lls.
This study suggests that elementary school children may have severe
difficulties in detecting logical contradictions in texts. The use of
certain methodological procedures, however, may have underestimated the
age and ability of children to detect contradictions. Furthermore, the
lack of a clear theory of comprehension confounds the interpretation of
her results. We know of no theoretical orientation suggesting that a
listener would immediately verbalize the existence of contradictory
information in a text. It is thought that the major emphasis during
comprehension involves "an effort after meaning" (Bartlett, 1932), such
that the primary allocation of resources and attention is directed toward
constructing a coherent representation of incoming information. A
listener may indeed recognize the existence of contradictory information,
but may easily construct inferences to reconcile the seemingly apparent
contradiction. Thus, when asked a question such as, "That's it. Well,
what do you think?," a subject may respond in terms of the implications
of the entire text rather than spontaneously verbalizing about the presence
of contradictory information. Unless a listener were directly probed
about the coherence of the material or their expectations, we would expect
little mention of the inconsistency. Indeed, when Markman initiated
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probes that included content, more children responded by supplying the
contradictory information. Thus, part of the difficulty in eliciting
contradictory information may be due to the type of specificity of the
question asked to elicit contradictory information.
A related problem is that readers may assume that errors in the text
are not intentional. According to Grice (1975), readers or listeners assume
that writers use standard conventions to convey what is important and
truthful about a particular topic under consideration. Thus, a reader
might initially detect an inconsistency, but work out a representation of
the text to correspond to what he thought the writer meant. In this
situation, the reader may, in fact, transform some of the incoming in-
formation, so that it corresponds more closely to what should have
occurred rather than what did occur in the text. When transformations
of the original text occur in a reader's recall, it is unclear as to
whether the reader can still maintain an accurate representation of the
original text. Although Markman (1979) reported that memory difficulties
rarely occurred in her studies (e.g., children could accurately retrieve
contradictory information in her studies), this has not always been the
case (Stein, 1979). Often children will delete the inconsistent portion
of the text, or transform or substitute information in the original text
to correspond with the remainder of the text information. In the case
where changes in the original text do occur, it is unclear as to whether
the original contradictory information can be retrieved from memory.
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A third problem is that the text information may never be perceived
as contradictory, specifically because a reader may not have the pre-
requisite knowledge to "detect" inconsistent information. This phenomenon
should occur, however, only in those conditions where the contradictions
are implied. An example of this type of contradiction occurs in Markman's
implicit condition, and a text presented in her implicit condition is
given at the bottom of Table 4.
For the text to be perceived as contradictory, children have to
believe certain things about fish, oceans, and light. For example, if
questioned, they would have to respond that fish can recognize the color
of food only with their eyes and that there is never, under any condition,
light at the bottom of the ocean. Since Markman did not assess children's
prior beliefs about each of the topics in her essay, we have no way of
knowing whether failure to verbalize about an inconsistency was due
to the child's knowledge about the objects and events under considera-
tion, or to the type of questions asked. Although children may believe
and understand that fish should see with their eyes, they may also
believe that there are circumstances where vision is not required. The
child might not be able to generate another method of "seeing" color,
but he may understand that one could exist. The same is true for the
properties of an ocean, or light.
Recent studies in the detection of inconsistencies in text. In an
effort to better understand children's skill at recognizing contradictory
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information, we (Stein & Trabasso, Note 12) have recently conducted a study
where 5- and 8-year-old children were asked to complete several compre-
hension tasks relating to their knowledge of personality traits and action.
Personality traits and actions were chosen because several past studies
(see Berndt & Heller, Note 13; Bryan, 1975; Hoffman, 1977; Shantz, 1975)
have offered unambiguous support that children make very specific in-
ferences about the appropriate actions of a person described by a particular
personality trait. One essential requirement for a child to recognize
that information is inconsistent in a text is the belief that only cer-
tain types of information can follow from previously presented events.
Thus, for information to be contradictory, it must violate the expecta-
tions of a listener about what should have occurred in the text.
Since adults use traits to refer to certain classes of a person's
behavior, we reasoned that children would do the same. The actions in-
cluded in trait descriptions, however, may vary as a function of develop-
ment. Nonetheless, it should be fairly easy to devise stories that
contain actions congruent or incongruent with certain personality des-
criptions. Therefore, kindergarten and third-grade children were pre-
sented with stories containing three types of information. First, where
character introduction that included a description of the protagonist's
habitual trait classification. Second, contextual framework (e.g., an
Initiating Event) that set up the necessity of an action or response on
the part of the protagonist. Third, protagonist's response to the event
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that consisted of a series of actions. For each of the three parts of
the story, content was included so that either a positive or negative
instance occurred and, therefore, produced congruent or incongruent parts.
For example, in one story:
1. John was either kind or mean.
2. John saw his friend Sally fall down in the street (the impli-
cation is that John would want to help Sally under normal
conditions) or John saw Sally steal his bike and smash it
against the wall (the implication is that John will be angry
with Sally and retaliate in some way).
3. John went over to Sally, asked her if she were hurt, and
offered to help her or John went over to Sally, made a face
at her, and then kicked her hard.
Each type of information was systematically varied so that all pos-
sible combinations of the types of information occurred. In all, eight
different story types were constructed. Table 5 contains examples of two
types of stories: one with all positive information, and one with all
negative information. Table 6 contains two oather stories. The first
contains positive trait information, a positive contextual framework, and
a negative action response (+ + -). The secoand contains the mirror opposite
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here.
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in terms of the composite valences: a negative trait, a negative con-
textual framework, and a positive action response (- - +). Note that
the action is incongruent with both the trait and context in both examples
given in Table 6. For each story version, children were asked to complete
several comprehension tasks: a moral judgment rating of the protagonist,
accurate story recall, and a series of probe questions.
In each condition, probe questions were asked in order to elicit more
detailed knowledge about the child's understanding of the story. In this
discussion, data from the first two questions are considered. The first
question asked was: "Did the story make sense to you?" If a child
answered no, he was then asked: "What in the story didn't make sense?"
For the second question, the child was asked: "Was there something in
the story you didn't expect?" If the child's answer was yes, the experi-
menter then asked: "What didn't you expect?"
The first question, the "sense" question, is similar to Markman's
(1979) question ("Did everything make sense?"), and implies that there
may have been something in the text that was not comprehensible to the
child. The proportion of "No" answers occurring in different conditions
are presented in Table 7. Certain information combinations elicited "No"
answers more frequently than other combinations. Children in both grades
Insert Table 7 about here.
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answered "No" significantly more to stories in which the trait and context
were congruent, but the action was incongruent. Other types of combina-
tions did not as frequently elicit a "No" response. Thus, only certain
types of incongruities were nonsensical to children.
The probability of citing inconsistent information, given that the
child stated the text did not make sense, however, was extremely high
in all experimental conditions, as can be seen in Table 8. Children who
said the text did not make sense had perceived the inconsistencies in
the text. In those conditions where certain inconsistencies occurred,
namely (+ + -) and (- - +), both kindergarten and third-grade children
detected nonsensical and inconsistent elements at a significantly higher
level than had been found in Markman's study. Specifically, over 67%
of the third-graders and 46% of the kindergartners detected inconsisten-
cies in those conditions where the actions were incongruent with the
trait and context.
Insert Table 8 about here.
The lower rate of detecting "incongruent" information in the other
conditions may have been due to the child's interpretation of the "sense"
question. On the second question, when children were asked, "Was there
something you didn't expect?", they detected and verbalized the relevant
incongruent pieces of information significantly more frequently than when
asked the first question. However, this change occurred more in the
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third-grade responses than in the kindergarten responses, as Tables 9 and
10 indicate. Although the probability of detecting incongruent information
Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here.
rose for kindergarten children when compared with responses from question
one, it was evident that many of these children did not detect inconsisten-
cies even if they did respond appropriately to the initial portion of
question two.
The reason for not detecting the "appropriate" inconsistent informa-
tion became more apparent when the kindergarten children's responses to
further questions were analyzed. After the initial two questions were
posed, additional questions were asked, inquiring if the child expected
the character to be described (e.g., personality trait) the way he or
she was described in the story and whether the child expected the character
to perform the actions that were carried out in the story.
In all those conditions where the character performed negative actions,
kindergarten children's responses to the action question (e.g., "Did you
expect John to go over to Bob, make a face at him, and kick him hard?")
were negative. Over 75% of the children in each condition said they did
not expect the action, and almost all children gave explicit reasons. As
an example, when the negative action occurred, independent of the trait
or context presented in the story, most kindergarten children spontaneously
said the action was inappropriate. What was most objectionable to these
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children was that the story character physically harmed another character.
Thus, they interpreted "expect" evaluatively rather than in terms of
integrating the trait or context with the action, as it refers to appro-
priate consistency of behavior.
The majority of kindergarten children suggested alternative courses of
action for the protagonist, saying that not helping another person would
be appropriate for a "mean" person, or in response to someone who had
stolen your bike. However, physical harm was inappropriate. Third-grade
children, however, again responded to this question as they did to the
first two questions. If they said they did not expect the action or trait,
their reasons almost always pertained to the inconsistent information pre-
sented in the text. These older children appeared to have interpreted
"expect" in terms of trait and action consistency.
Another difficulty experienced by kindergarten children was the type
of behavior they expected once a character was described in certain ways.
Children who responded that there was no inconsistency in the character's
behavior often volunteered that "you can still be nice even though you
were mean before." These children seemed to be unwilling to accept mean-
ness as a pervasive, consistent personality trait, whereas third-graders
expected more consistency between a character's actions and traits.
The results from this study show the detection of inconsistent in-
formation is a function of several factors. Most important are the pro-
cedures used to elicit knowledge of inconsistencies in a text and the prior
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knowledge the children bring to the task. In our study, relatively few
third-grade children had difficulty detecting inconsistent information
when certain combinations of information were presented. Kindergarten
children had more difficulty, although half of them noticed inconsistent
information.
The major problem for these younger children appears to be concerned
with their knowledge base (e.g., what kinds of knowledge they had about
human behavior in terms of the predictability and consistency of actions,
given certain traits), rather than their inability to make inferences con-
cerning knowledge already available to them. Several of our subjects,
especially the kindergarten children, had memory and comprehension diffi-
culties. They often expressed confusion over the character trait or
the action of the protagonist, and when questioned, were not sure exactly
what had occurred in the text. These errors may be indicative of the
child's belief that when information occurring in the text does not cor-
respond to an accurate representation of the child's reality, it should
be transformed so that it does conform more to what the child expected.
These results are similar to those reported in a study by Wimmer (in
press) who use pictures to elicit knowledge about inconsistencies in
stories.
Summary
Through the use of materials believed to be familiar to the children
and general questioning, children as young as 4½ to 5 years old have
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skills at detecting text inconsistencies that were thought to emerge only
in the later elementary school years. The critical variable affecting
performance appears to be the domain-specific knowledge that children
bring to the task about the topic at hand (see Gelman, 1978, for review
of the literature on young children's cognitive skills and knowledge).
If we are to be successful at instructing children and helping them
acquire new skills, then at some point a more accurate assessment of what
young children know, as well as what they don't know, must be made. For
it is the level of acquired knowledge upon which most instruction is based.
Thus, higher level skills, such as comprehension monitoring or the ability
to report inconsistencies spontaneously, are also dependent upon knowl-
edge and beliefs about the text information and the social context in
which the task occurs.
Memory for Story Events
Another issue receiving wide attention concerns memory for individual
events in a given story. In this section, we discuss three aspects of
event memory: (1) systematic patterns of event recall from stories;
(2) theoretical models and hypotheses that attempt to explain these
findings; and (3) tests of some of these hypotheses.
Patterns of Recall
In several studies (Glenn, 1978; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Mandler,
Scrlibner, Cole, & DeForest, 1980; Stein & Glenn, Note 4, 1979), the pattern
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of event recall was found to be highly similar over a wide age group of
children and over different cultures. Events in certain categories (or
nodes) were better recalled than events in other categories. The most
frequently recalled events were setting statements that introduced the
protagonist, initiating events, and consequences. The least frequently
recalled events were minor setting statements that described the con-
textual framework for the story events, internal responses, including
emotional reactions, cognitions, and minor goals, and reactions, in-
cluding emotional responses and ending statements. Although not recalled
as well as the most salient categories, attempts and major goals were,
for the most part, well recalled (Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Stein &
Glenn, 1979).
Explanations for Patterns of Story Recall
Although the initial studies showed a strong correlation between
recall and an event's category membership, this finding is not explanatory.
Furthermore, as Stein and Glenn (1979) argue, the variation of item
recall within a category, although minimal at times, must also be con-
sidered and explained. Several such explanations for these data have
been offered (Black, 1977; Black & Bower, 1980; Nezworski, et al., Note 3;
Rumelhart, 1977; Stein, 1978, 1979; Stein & Glenn, 1979). All of them
generally focus on the structure of an episode and the semantic relation-
ships among the events in an episode. This type of explanation is in
direct contrast to a possible "category" explanation, which relies more
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on the function of an event in an episode, as well as the temporal loca-
tion of the specific event.
Rumelhart (1977) offered the first of these explanations when he
completed a study on adult summarization and recall strategies. In contrast
to his earlier work (1975). Rumelhart chose the multiple episode story
as his major focus of attention. He was interested in how stories with
more than one goal path would be represented and recalled.
In describing these complex stories, Rumelhart divided the structure
of a story into three components. First, the initial event and desire to
obtain a superordinate goal, labeled the CAUSE component. Second, the
general TRY component, containing the method and attempt for achieving
the goal. Third, the OUTCOME or result of whether the goal was achieved.
Because complex stories were chosen, Rumelhart emphasized that any of
the three major components could contain several subcomponents embedded
within the highest component. To illustrate this, Rumelhart chose to
describe the TRY component in some detail. This part includes the pro-
tagonist's plan and attempt for obtaining the superordinate goal, and
often includes a series of subgoals that must be attained before the
successful achievement of the superordinate goal.
In describing the tree structure for these types of complex stories,
Rupmelhart argued that a comprehender would construct different levels of
organization for story events, with the superordinate goal, the general TRY
component and the outcome being at the highest level. The subgoals, their
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attempts, and outcomes would be at lower levels of the hierarchy, depending
upon their relationship to the superordinate goal. Rumelhart then pro-
posed that there would be a close relationship between the level of an
event in the hierarchy and the probability of its being summarized or
recalled. The higher and more general the event, the greater probability
of its being recalled. The main factor regulating the level of an event
was its relationship to the superordinate goal.
Stein (1978, 1979) and Stein and Glenn (1979) also identified four
factors accounting for recall. These are: the causal relationship be-
tween each story statement and the superordinate goal (e.g., the direct
causes and consequences of the goal), causal relationships between events
other than the goal, the causal relationship between an event and the
outcome of an attempt, and the inferability of a statement in relation-
ship to other story events.
Black (1977; Black & Bower, 1979, 1980; Black, Note 14), in an attempt
to further Rumelhart's (1977) viewpoint, took a problem-solving approach
to story recall. Using this approach, the protagonist is thought of as
being faced with a problem to be solved and must formulate a plan and
set of actions to solve the problem (e.g., to attain the goal). According
to Black, the essence of this approach can be described by a hierarchical
state transition model, where, in achieving a goal, the protagonist is
changing from one state to another.
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In predicting memory for story events, Black argues that the compre-
hender constructs a representation causally linking those events on the
"critical" path from the initial events causing the problem to the success-
ful outcome or desired state. The representation of these paths is
hierarchically arranged, and corresponds to Rumelhart's (1977) description
of complex stories. Thus, Black adheres to the notion of a superordinate
and subgoal analysis of stories, with subgoals and specific details com-
posing the lower levels of his hierarchy. The only major difference
between Rumelhart's and Black's predictions for recall concern the proba-
bility of recalling failed subgoals and attempts. In Black's analysis,
goal failures would not be recalled very well because they do not relate
directly to the successful problem solution. Rumelhart (1977), however,
states that in certain situations, the failure to accomplish a goal
should increase the recall of this portion of the TRY component, because
the comprehender must know what was done and why it did not work.
Omanson (in press) attempted to identify three different kinds of
events in stories: central, supportive, and distracting. Central events
are causally related to the outcomes of the protagonist actions. Supportive
events are related in more detailed and elaborative ways to central events,
functioning much like Rumelhart's subgoal structures (e.g., the TRY com-
ponent). Distracting events are irrelevant or not causally related to
the central event structure. Omanson's assumptions are that comprehenders
will recall more central events than supportive and more supportive than
distracting.
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A common theme underlying all of these explanations is that stories
reflect human problem situations, and one of the central components of
problem solving concerns the way in which individuals set goals and
achieve them (Black & Bower, 1980; Rumelhart, 1977; Stein, 1978, 1979).
As summarized in a recent thesis describing a computer model for story
comprehension (Wilensky, Note 8), the comprehender interprets a story in
terms of the goals and purposes of the protagonist(s). Events occur that
give rise to hypotheses concerning the goals and plans of the protagonist.
After inferring what the goals and plans of the protagonist are, the
comprehender can use these inferences to interpret subsequent actions
and outcomes. During this process, a representation of the story is
constructed that includes those events that give rise to a goal-directed
sequence of events.
Tests of Hypotheses and Explanations for Recall
In this section, we review three studies that bear on the assumption
that events which are goal-related (Nezworski, et al., Note 3), causally
and purposefully related (Omanson, 1979, in press), and high in the problem
solving hierarchy are recalled well.
In a study closely related to previous ones on story recall, Nezworski,
et al. (Note 3) pointed out that although the patterns of story recall
were consistent across populations, the goal-relatedness of an event,
rather than its category membership, should be the more important factor
in predicting recall. They argued that from previous studies it was
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difficult to determine if this were the case because categorical informa-
tion varies not only in its form, function, and temporal location, but
also in the particular semantic content being expressed. To control for
the latter factor, stories were constructed where the semantic informa-
tion in each of five categories was controlled and directly related (by
inferential means) to the protagonist's superordinate goal.
Table 11 contains an example of one of the "standard" stories used by
Nezworski, et al. Table 12 includes the information inserted into the
five different experimental versions of the standard story. For example,
when the inserted information belonged to the Initiating Event category,
Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here.
the two corresponding statements listed in Table 12 were inserted between
statements 4 and 5 of the story listed in Table 11.
Nezworski, Stein, and Trabasso had kindergarten and second-grade
children (ages ranging from 4 to 9) recall the stories, and answer probe
and recognition questions concerning the content inserted into the standard
version. The results showed no differences in recall, probed recall, or
recognition for the five categories studied. Thus retrieval was independent
of the category membership of the information. These findings contrast
the pattern found when the content and goal relatedness of story cate-
gories were not controlled. As evidence for further support of the
importance of goal-relatedness, these investigators also found that recall
What's in a Story
67
of individual story statements within the standard version also varied as
a function of the event's relationship to the goal.
Another method of investigating the importance of goal-relatedness is
to hold the position and content of a category constant and vary whether
the statements are goal-related or causally and purposefully related.
Omanson (1979), in a recent Ph.D. thesis, systematically varied the
centrality (or the degree of causal relationship) of internal responses
and reactions in a story sequence. These two categories of information
occurred in three different story versions, where each category was made
either central or irrelevant by adding, altering, or omitting other state-
ments. Omanson found that those statements that were causally and
purposefully related were rated as more important, summarized twice as
frequently, recalled twice as frequently in the immediate condition,
and recalled more than twice as often one week later. The only exception
to these generalizations was that the emotional reactions were less well
recalled, regardless of their centrality.
In a thesis study, Black (1977) constructed stories of common human
problem-solving situations (e.g., finding a book in a library) and had
college students rate the importance of story statements as well as recall
them. Black showed that events on the "critical path," or statements
related to superordinate goals, were better recalled than those not so
related. However, successful outcomes were not recalled consistently
better than unsuccessful ones, as Black had expected.
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Thus, in three different investigations, goal-directed causally-
related statements were more salient, as measured by their importance
ratings, summary likelihoods, and recall. The commonly held view that
stories depict goal-directed event sequences where protagonists attempt
to solve problems or overcome obstacles seems to be well supported by the
data. Children as young as 4 years appear to have sufficient knowledge
about human motivation to interpret the events as episodic sequences and
to understand that some events are more central than others.
Necessary Advances for a Theory of Importance
Up to this point we have ignored some of the difficulties in defining
and constructing a theory of importance because we felt it essential to
show the strong support for current frameworks involving theories of human
problem solving. However, in order to make new theoretical and applied
advances, several current problems must be resolved. One problem under-
lying all research in this area concerns the criteria used to choose
those items that are important or central and those items that are not.
To date all investigators have used subjective methods of assessment.
That is, they either decide what is important in terms of their own knowl-
edge or they ask people to choose causally or purposefully related items.
While this method is necessary to begin studies, more overt criteria must
be established so that a priori predictions can be made about representa-
tion. Otherwise, it becomes exceedingly difficult to make any clear
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predictions concerning comprehension and importance. An example of this
difficulty can be seen by examining one of the stories Rumelhart (1977)
analyzed and used, The Countryman and the Serpent.
In this story, a countryman's son steps on a serpent's tail. The
serpent in turn bites the son, who dies. The father of the son pursues
the serpent in revenge, cutting off parts of his tail. The serpent, in
turn, stings the farmer's cattle, causing great losses to the farmer.
The farmer then decides that he must make peace with the serpent, but the
serpent will not be placated and tells the farmer to take his gifts away.
In Rumelhart's analysis of this story, the most important goal (e.g.,
the goal highest in the hierarchy) was the man's effort to restore peace.
This goal occurs after many others in the story. In our subjective
assessment, the major goal would be the man's desire to seek revenge,
which was never successful. Perhaps Rumelhart decided that peacemaking
was the more important goal because it was eventually substituted for
revenge. However, when an initial goal is blocked and goal substitution
occurs, what are the theoretical dimensions used in deciding the level
of placement in a goal hierarchy?
Obviously, the answer lies in the assumptions an investigator makes
about theories of naive psychology and a comprehender's knowledge of
human motivation. At this date, however, it is not clear what knowledge
is being used by a comprehender and what criteria are used for deciding
the importance of an item. Thus, it is imperative that we begin to focus
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on the development of a process model that incorporates assumptions about
knowledge of human motivation. Recent work by Wilensky (Note 8) on
representing story information in terms of plans and goal-conflicts and
Kintsch and van Dijk's (1978) model for discourse processing are promising
beginnings. Hopefully, future work in this direction will account for
the set of findings and hypotheses reviewed here. At the moment, we
seem to be in a situation where factors and units of importance have been
identified, and experimental support has been provided for these hypotheses.
How these factors operate to create the structure described by the grammars
and other narrative analyses (e.g., the active process of comprehension)
remains largely unknown.
CURRENT ISSUES IN STORY COMPREHENSION
In our final section we address three issues which are currently
receiving much attention by investigators in the field: (1) the problem
of defining the concept of a story; (2) the limitations of current models
for the development of process models of comprehension; and (3) the
importance of translating current research into practical implications
and guidelines for classroom instruction in comprehension.
The Definition of a Story
Despite widespread agreement on several dimensions which define a
story (e.g., stories supposedly communicate information about goal-directed
activities or problem-solving behavior and contain identifiable constituents
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such as episodes, beginnings, endings, etc.), several investigators have
raised questions as to whether the current definitions of stories are
detailed enough or whether current definitions might be too limited.
Implied in these questions are concerns about the psychological validity
of the current definitions of stories. The critical question being posed
pertains to those features which must be included in an event sequence
in order for someone to identify a discourse sequence as a story. Do
current descriptions of story structures include all of the possible
features which must be included in the concept of story?
These questions have arisen because the dimensions of stories des-
cribed in much of the recent work do not consider all possible variations
that could exist in a given folktale. For example, Rumelhart's (1975)
initial description of story structures included only those folktales
which contained one episode. Subsequent work, however, by Mandler and
Johnson (1977), Stein and Glenn (1979), and Thorndyke (1977) have in-
creased the type of stories which can be structurally represented. For
example, stories containing more than one episode can be described, and
some of these stories contain more than one protagonist. In fact, by
describing how episodes can be embedded in one another (Johnson & Mandler,
1980; Mandler & Johnson, 1977; Rumelhart, 1977; Stein & Glenn, 1979;
Thorndyke, 1977) and by describing the nature of the goal structures
contained in individual stories (Wilensky, Note 8), it is now possible
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to represent the point of view of more than one protagonist in a story.
Additionally, Wilensky (Note 8) has enabled us to begin a study of how
the specific semantic content could be included in the concept of a story
(e.g., he formulates a theory of goal conflict and conflict resolution),
while Bruce and Newman (1978) have detailed the description of certain
stories containing the interactive plans of two or more protagonists.
In these ways, the definition of a story involving the description of prob-
lem solving sequences is becoming more detailed in terms of the possible
variations that could exist.
The question remains as to whether all of these features are neces-
sary for a piece of discourse to be called a story. Some of the described
features may be necessary and others may be optional. Furthermore,
specific features included in the concept of a story may change as a
function of development or as a function of exposure to different types
of stories.
A few initial studies have been completed with this question in mind.
Glenn and Stein (Note 6) investigated children's concept of a story by
asking children from the ages of five to twelve to tell an example of a
"good" story. These investigators found that although the majority of
children's stories were episodic in nature and contained motive-resolution
sequences, there were several "stories" that did not contain the basic
core features described in current models of story comprehension. These
stories could be classified into three major subtypes:
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1. a descriptive-sequence story, in which states, traits and actions
of a protagonist are included, with no temporal constraints
on the sequence of events produced. These sequences were more
like elaborated setting statements, rather than episodic
sequences.
2. an action sequence story, corresponding to Schank and Abelson's
(1977) notion of a script. Here, the stories contained habitual
everyday actions of a protagonist, temporally arranged in order
of occurrence, usually from the beginning of a day to the end.
Despite the temporality, there was not necessarily any direct
causal connections between the events, nor was there a dis-
cernable motive-resolution sequence with a beginning and an
end.
3. a reactive sequence story, where there was a beginning and an
end, with the events causally related to each other. In this
type of story sequence, however, the protagonist never developed
a goal or a plan because of external circumstances. The pro-
tagonist's well-being was totally dependent on environmental
circumstances or actions of other people. Thus the core of a
story, the goal or plan, was deleted.
Glenn and Stein found that 48% of the kindergarten children, 31% of
third grade children, and 24% of fifth grade children told these types of
stories, even when children were asked at the end if they thought that
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their stories were examples of good stories. On the other hand, over half
of all the children in each grade level did produce stories with an
episodic structure as described in current models. Glenn and Stein also
found that kindergarten children were almost as likely as third and
fifth grade children to tell stories containing more than one episode
(e.g., containing more complex variations of the basic story structure).
These results suggest that children, especially those in kindergarten,
have a concept of story that is broader than originally proposed in
current story models. Since the Glenn and Stein results clearly showed
that children of all ages were indeed capable of producing stories with
episodic structures, we cannot say that young children lack an awareness
of certain story features. Rather, we propose that the critical dif-
ference between younger and older children's concept of stories is the
number and type of features that must be included in a sequence in order
for the child to label it a story. As children develop, their concept of
story should become more detailed, so that if a sequence does not contain
certain features, it will not be labeled a story.
In order to investigate whether this hypothesis had any validity, we
carried out a study in collaboration with one of our graduate students,
Margaret Pollicastro. In this dissertation study, seven-year-old children
and teachers of elementary school children were asked to judge whether or
not different types of sequences were or were not stories. Two different
techniques were used to elicit judgments from both children and teachers.
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In the first task, subjects were simply asked to judge whether or not each
of the presented sequences was or was not a story. In the second task,
subjects were asked to rate each sequence on a seven-point scale, with
one being labeled not a story, four being labeled a story with all of
its parts, and seven being labeled the best story heard.
The type of materials used in this study were constructed to conform
to the categories outlined in the Glenn and Stein (Note 6) study, as well
as conforming to our rationale of critical dimensions which should be
included in a story concept. Stories ranged in complexity from single
sentences, which included animate or inanimate objects, to sequences con-
taining only parts of stories, to full episodes. Most of the stimulus
materials were varied as to the structural features claimed to be
necessary for a sequence to be called a story, however some sequences
were varied as to whether or not goal attainment was required to occur
in an episode. This was accomplished by having the protagonist succeed
in the process of goal attainment or having the protagonist fail at goal
attainment.
A.critical finding was that significantly more second graders accepted
the Glenn and Stein (Note 8) non-motive-resolution sequences as stories
than did teachers, indicating that these types of stories are told not
because children are incapable of producing more complex stories, but
because young children believe these types of event sequences to be
stories. The results from Task 2, the seven-point rating scale task,
What's in a Story
76
confirmed the results from Task I. So clearly, second-grade children
have a concept of a story that is broader than originally conceived.
A second set of findings has to do with distinctions made once the
sequence is accepted as a story. Causal sequences were rated higher than
descriptive or action sequences, and stories that included all parts were
rated higher than those missing specific parts. The highest ranking
story included a sequence with an obstacle in the path of a protagonist,
where the protagonist eventually overcame the obstacle. Brewer and
Lichtenstein (Note 15) have completed a similar study with adults and
have shown that the normal temporal order of "an ordinary" predictable
sequence must be altered in order to induce interest value in an adult.
Their findings support the contention that stories must be more complex
or unusual in order to be classified as a "good" story.
These results, while interesting and provocative, just begin to
tap the surface of the necessary work that needs to be completed in this
area. Because writing and comprehension are such central accomplishments
for all children, it becomes imperative that we further clarify both the
child's and adult's conception and knowledge about various discourse
structures, such as the story. Although children may be able to judge
different degrees of goodness in stories, their minimal standards for
constructing a story appear to be different from adults. Perhaps some
of the real difficulty children experience in writing "good" coherent
narratives is that their definition of what constitutes a "good" story
differs significantly from their teachers'.
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We know of no curriculum package to date which describes whether or
not this transition occurs and then attempts to delineate the basic com-
ponents of a story and what it would take to teach children to learn to
write good stories. One of the possible reasons for this absence is that
many teachers and educators may assume that children have acquired an
accurate concept of a "good" story by reading a wide variety of story
materials. However, there is no evidence to date that this type of spon-
taneous learning occurs. Furthermore, it is not clear as to what the
degree of consensus would be in determining just what makes a story
"good."
Our initial results suggest that there is substantial agreement on
the structural components of a "good" story. However, our study did not
include all of the possible structural variations which could be included
in a story, nor did it include any variations of the semantic and func-
tional features that might be critical to the concept of a "good" story.
We suspect that there may not be such wide agreement on what constitutes
a "good" story when specific semantic and functional requirements are
discussed. Otherwise there would be few debates among film critics
or different psychological models of comprehensions as to which one is
better.
Because a teacher's beliefs about the "goodness" of written discourse
has such a powerful impact on the children being taught, it is critical
that we begin to examine exactly what these concepts are, how overtly
they are taught in the schools, the methods by which they are taught,
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and the degree of success children have in learning the critical dimensions
necessary for good writing skills to be acquired.
The Development of Process Models for Comprehension
The way in which the term "comprehension" has been used throughout
this article has been somewhat implicit. What we have assumed is that
a reader or listener comprehends a story when he or she is able to con-
struct a coherent representation of the story under consideration. The
process of representation has been viewed as being influenced by the
type of expectations a reader or listener has concerning the information
that should occur in a story. It has been assumed that the reader knows
what dimensions have occurred in stories and therefore expects to find
these dimensions in a story. Presumably, many of these expectations
are described in the current story grammars, although we have pointed out
that expectations pertaining to the specific type of goal structures in
stories, aswell as to the specific event knowledge are also important.
Once a reader constructs a coherent representation of a passage, this
representation can then be used to answer questions, retell the story,
or create new stories based upon information in a particular text.
Understanding involves the assimilation of events into current schematic
knowledge and the retrieval of such events to make further inferences
or create new structures.
If this point of view of comprehension is adopted, then it is easy
to understand why there has been such a reliance on recall and summariza-
tion of incoming information. Both of these measures are highly correlated
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with the centrality or importance of an event in an internal representa-
tion (Omanson, 1979; in press) and remain a good test for how well the
comprehender initially understands and encodes a story (Day, Stein,
Trabasso, & Shirey, Note 2). These measures, however, are restrictive
when the process of comprehension is considered (Baker & Stein, 1981;
Johnson & Mandler, 1980; Trabasso, 1981).
What appears to be lacking is a more explicit model of how compre-
hension actually occurs. At present, the story representations described
by the grammars are structural or outcome descriptions and not process
models. They include memorial representation assumptions but not theories
about memory operations per se. An ideal process model should take the
text as a data base, operate upon it, and represent the underlying ideas
as propositions in a coherent framework. Once the representation is
formed, operations of retrieval, interpretation, paraphrase, summariza-
tion, etc., can be applied. The grammars may be viewed as schemata
necessary for the construction of so-called macrostructures, as in Kintsch
and van Dijk's (1978) model.
These investigators propose that during comprehension, two representa-
tions are successively formed. The first is a microstructure that
corresponds closely to the surface propositional structure of the text.
The second is a macrostructure that results from operations of using rules
and schemata. During the creation of the macrostructure, story schemata
are proposed to be critical. These schemata are thought to be used to
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construct a more economical representation of a text as well as to aid in
the generation of a coherent text. In order to implement schemata
during comprehension, it appears that very elaborate process models would
be necessary, emphasizing short term memory limitations (Kintsch & Vipond,
1979), and the interaction of schemata with incoming information to create
a resulting representation. To date, only a few investigators have
approached these issues. It is clear, however, that if we are to make
real progress in our efforts at understanding comprehension, more effort
must occur in the area of developing a process model.
Educational Issues and Implications
Educators and teachers have been primarily interested in two broad
questions: (a) under what conditions does comprehension occur; and (b) if
it doesn't how can children be taught to understand what they read. A
corollary of the second question is: how can children learn new informa-
tion from text.
In terms of answering the first question, we have shown that by school
age, even young kindergarten children have acquired a great deal of knowl-
edge about stories, and that this knowledge allows them to assimilate much
incoming information, provided that the story information conforms to their
expectations about what should occur in a story. If the structure or the
content of the text violates expectations, then, most often, comprehension
will decrease or be seriously impaired. We have reviewed many research
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studies which substantiate this claim (see Baker & Stein, 1981; Mandler,
1979; Stein, 1979; Thorndyke & Yekovitch, 1980). Thus, how easily a
child understands a story depends upon how well-formed it is.
It is not surprising that basal readers for the early grades rely
heavily upon folktales, fables, and myths in the early reading phases.
However, many of these texts have been simplified, due to theories about
a child's lack of critical vocabulary knowledge. The result of this
simplification process is often more confusion and poorer comprehension
than if the original elaborated text had been included in the basal reader.
Beck, McKeown, McCaslin, and Burkes (Note 17) point out that limitation
of vocabulary usage often leads to ellipses in story structure and to
the deletion of causal relationship between pairs of statements. Such
deletions, disorderings, or distortions place high inference demands on
children and most of them are not generative enough to guarantee that
accurate comprehension will occur. Thus, whenever possible, the stories
written for young readers should be as explicit and as coherently organized
as possible, conforming to the notions about importance and structural
expectations reviewed earlier in this chapter.
The texts in most basal readers, however, are not necessarily written
according to these specifications. As we mentioned before, parts are
often missing, irrelevant episodes are often inserted, and causal con-
nections are often deleted, without the author thinking about the conse-
quences of using these techniques. Even in those instances where texts
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are written in a coherent and causally organized fashion, children are
often not familiar with some of the basic concepts entertained in the
passage. If these conditions prevail, what would be the optimal strategy
for a teacher to use to ensure that accurate comprehension occurs?
The first necessary task would be to determine just how much children
understood about the concepts which are to be included in the story under
consideration. This can be done by having the teacher prepare a list of
questions, the answers to which are essential for the commencement of
the reading lesson. This type of orientation task is not unusual, and
many teachers already use such techniques. The difficulty comes in
developing assessment techniques to determine whether or not the appro-
priate questions are being asked, and then developing a productive
strategy to use when children can't answer orientation questions in
enough detail. Thus, the issue of how children acquire knowledge in
a specific content domain becomes a critical issue.
At this time there are few studies which have investigated this
issue, especially in the realm of story understanding. It has been
assumed by many investigators that because young children do have a
great deal of knowledge about story content and structure, that almost
any theme can be pre and understood in a text. This is not the
case, however. There are substantial content differences in children's
knowledge of social situations, as portrayed in stories and film
(Bisanz, in press; Flappan, 1968; Goldman, in press; Stein, Trabasso,
& Garfin, Note 7). The task is to achieve a level of understanding as
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to how and when different types of social concepts are acquired, and what
methods are the most successful to ensure acquisition.
For those texts where the child is familiar with most of the content,
but where the structure is disruptive or not causally connected in some
fashion, there are techniques that have been proposed to ensure better
comprehension. Beck, et al. (Note 17) argue that the teacher should
use questions to promote the construction of a story map, which cor-
responds to the definition of an episode and which should help the child
construct a coherent representation of the incoming information. For
example, each question asked should enable the child to retrieve the
central information in a narrative, especially that information that is
directly related to the protagonist's goal attainment. If questions
like this are asked, the child can quickly decide which information is
relevant or irrelevant. Then if information is irrelevant, the child
can attempt to understand why the information is irrelevant. This
questioning procedure is very much like teaching children the basic
components necessary to construct a good summary of the story.
This procedure also allows a child to become sensitive to shifts
in points of view. Many stories begin by communicating the goals of one
character and then because the first character is dependent on the coopera-
tion of a second character, the story often switches focus to the goals
of the second character. In some stories, the sequence never shifts
back to the first character, who in fact becomes ancillary to the gist
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of the story. By having children use and answer a set of questions which
follows the goals, plans, and goal attainments of each character in the
story, the child can begin to decipher the important parts from the un-
important parts.
Wimmer (Note 16) completed a questioning study with four- and six-
year-old children, where he asked a series of why questions concerning
each of the character's attempts in a version of the Donkey story, used
initially by Rumelhart (1977). Wimmer found that those children who
could accurately answer these questions also scored highest on accurate
recall of the story. He also found that children's answers to non-
causal questions (e.g., those questions not focusing on the relationship
between events but instead focusing on events within a statement; see
Trabasso, in press, for a taxonomy of questions) did not correlate with
the amount recalled.
Wimmer's results indicate that question-asking is a good assessment
procedure to determine whether or not comprehension occurs. Further, his
study indicates that the type of question asked is critical in assessing
whether comprehension occurs. What is now needed is a study which in-
vestigates whether or not questioning can be used to facilitate compre-
hension and guide the construction of a more economical representation
of events, as suggested previously in this discussion.
The necessity for teaching children questioning strategies implies
that although they might be able to use schematic knowledge to aid in
understanding incoming information, they may not be able to actively
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use this knowledge to reorganize incoming information unless specifically
instructed to do so. In order to facilitate the ability to reorganize
texts, questioning procedures can be used in conjunction with story
writing or story construction tasks so that children can pick and choose
the type of information that would be appropriate to answer some of the
questions necessary to construct a story map.
Rubin (Note 18) has attempted to construct a task that is somewhat
similar to this suggestion. She has taken the concept of a story-tree
from the current grammars and has constructed a device whereby children
can compose stories by making choices among the segments. The resulting
story traces the pathway from the beginning to the end, showing children
the choices along the way. This type of technique is useful in the
following way. First of all, the parts that must be included in a story
can be distinctly pointed out, clarifying exactly what types of infor-
mation should be included in each part. This can be done both at the
concrete level, identifying specific knowledge that is relevant to the
story, and at the more abstract schematic level, identifying the part
of the story under consideration.
In subsequent tasks, parts of the story can be deleted and children
can be asked to fill in the missing information, both in the specific
and schematic sense. Then children can be asked to produce their own
stories. In this way, the concept of a story can be directly taught,
specifying the components that must be included in a story. Also, this
technique can be used to lessen the memory demands children face when
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beginning to learn how to write stories. If children are not initially
familiar with all of the components to be included in a story, then the
demands of writing may be too much for them. The question remains as
to how much children really know about the use of discourse schemata
and whether or not they can apply the knowledge they have acquired.
In summary, the use of questioning techniques and story maps get
us directly into the arena of how children learn from texts. It is
evident that this must become one of the central themes of current
research efforts if we are to make a significant impact on policies
used in the classroom. The use of schemata can be labor-saving devices
for constructing, editing, and reading stories. The conditions under
which this use can occur is necessary for future study.
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Table 1
Categories and Types of Causal Relations
Occurring in a Simple Story
1. SETTING
Allow:
Introduction of the protagonist; contains information
about the social, physical, or temporal context in
which the story events occur.
Episode:
1. INITIATING
EVENT
Cause
3. INTERNAL
RESPONSE
Cause
4. ATTEMPT
Cause
or
Enable
5. CONSEQUENCE
Cause
6. Reaction
An action, an internal event, or a physical event that
serves to initiate the story-line or cause the pro-
tagonist to respond emotionally and to formulate a
goa l.
An emotional reaction and a goal, often incorporating
the thought of the protagonist that cause him to
initiate action.
An overt action or series of actions, carried out in
the service of attaining a goal.
An event, action, or endstate, marking the attainment
or nonattainment of the protagonist's goal.
An internal response expressing the protagonist's
feelings about the outcome of his actions or the
occurrence of broader, general consequences resulting
from the goal attainment or nonattainment of the
protagonist.
_ F ·
_ __
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Table 1 (continued)
Example of a Well Formed Story
Setting
Initiating
Event
Internal
Response
Attempt
Consequence
Reaction
1. Once there was a big grey fish named Albert.
2. He lived in a big icy pond near the edge of a
forest.
3. One day, Albert was swimming around the pond.
4. Then he spotted a big juicy worm on the top of
the water.
5. Albert knew how delicious worms tasted.
6. He wanted to eat that one for his dinner.
7. So he swam very close to the worm.
8. Then he bit into him.
9. Suddenly, Albert was pulled through the water
into a boat.
10. He had been caught by a fisherman.
11. Albert felt sad.
12. He wished he had been more careful.
L ' '
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Table 2
Niobe Story: Piaget's Version (1923/1960)
Story Statement Category Type
Once there was a lady
who was called Niobe
(and who) had 12 sons and 12 daughters.
She met a fairy
who had only one son and no daughter.
(Missing Internal Response
Then the lady laughed at the fairy
because the fairy had only one boy.
The fairy was very angry
and fastened the lady to a rock.
The lady cried for ten years.
In the end (she) turned into a rock,
and (her) tears made a stream
which still runs today.
Setting
Setting
Setting
Initiating Event
Setting
Initiating Event
Setting
Internal Response
Attempt
Consequence
Consequence
Reaction
Reaction
I .
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
__
_
_
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Table 3
The Conclusion and Setting Versions from
McClure, Mason and Barnitz (1979)
Conclusion Version
1. The border police have found a new helper that drug smugglers cannot
fool. (Conclusion)
2. One day, they searched a truck which they thought contained drugs.
3. But they did not find anything.
4. Then they led a German Shepherd to the truck.
5. He sniffed at the truck floor.
6. Pulling it up, the police found a fortune in drugs.
Setting Version
1. One day a suspicious truck drove up to the border.
2. The border police searched it but could not find anything.
3. Then they led a German Shepherd to the truck.
4. He sniffed at the truck floor.
5. Pulling it up, the police found a fortune in drugs.
6. They had also found a new helper that drug smugglers could not fool.
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Table 4
Examples of Essays from Markman's (1979)
Explicit and Implicit Conditions
(authors' italics)
Fish: Explicit Condition
Many different kinds of fish live in the ocean. Some fish have
heads that make them look like alligators, and some fish have heads that
make them look like cats. Fish live in different parts of the ocean.
Some fish live near the surface of the water, but some fish live way down
at the bottom of the ocean. Fish must have light in order to see. There
is absolutely no light at the bottom of the ocean. It is pitch black
down there. When it is that dark the fish cannot see anything. They can-
not even see colors. Some fish that live at the bottom of the ocean can
see the color of their food; that is how they know what to eat.
Fish: Implicit Condition
Many different kinds of fish live in the ocean. Some fish have
heads that make them look like alligators, and some fish have heads that
make them look like cats. Fish live in different parts of the ocean.
Some fish live near the surface of the water, but some fish live way down
at the bottom of the ocean. There is absolutely no light at the bottom of
the ocean. Some fish that live at the bottom of the ocean kn6w their food
by its color. They will only eat red fungus.
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Table 5
Complete Positive and Negative Story Versions
(from Stein & Trabasso, Note 12)
Kind Version ( + + + )
Personality Once there was a boy named John.
Trait Description
John was always kind to people.
Everyone said that John was a kind, nice boy.
Contextual One day he saw Sally fall down in the street.
Framework
She spilled her toys and books all over
the street.
Initiated John went over to Sally
Action
and asked Sally if she were hurt.
Then he helped her get up.
Mean Version ( - - - )
Personality
Trait Description
Contextual
Framework
Initiated
Action
Once there was a boy named John.
John was always mean to people.
Everyone said that John was a mean bully.
One day he saw Bob steal his new bicycle.
Bob smashed John's bicycle against a wall.
John went over to Bob
and made a face at Bob.
Then John kicked him hard.
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Table 6
Inconsistent Story Versions from Stein and Trabasso (Note 12)
Kind Version ( + + - )
Personality
Trait Description
Contextual
Framework
Ini tiated
Action
Once there was a boy named John.
John was always kind to people.
Everyone said John was a kind, nice boy.
One day he saw Sally fall down in the street.
She spilled her boys and books all over the
street.
John went over to Sally.
John made a face at Sally,
and then he kicked her hard.
Mean Version ( - - + )
Personali ty
Trait Description
Contextual
Framework
Once there was a boy named John.
John was always mean to people.
Everyone said John was a mean bully.
One day he saw Sally steal his new bicycle.
Sally smashed John's bicycle against the wall.
Initiated
Action
John went over to Sally.
John asked if she were hurt
and then he helped her get up.
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Table 7
Proportion of "No" Answers to the Question:
"Did the story make sense?"
Story Versions Kindergarten Third Grade
Trait, context, actions ( + + + )
all positive or or .12 .08
all negative ( - - - )
Trait and context ( + + - )
congruent; or .46 .67
action incongruent ( - - + )
Trait and action ( + - + )
congruent; or .25 .12
context incongreunt (- +- )
Context and action ( + - - )
congruent; or .12 .20
trait incongruent ( - + + )
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Table 8
Conditional Probability of Citing Two Incongruent Pieces of Information
in a Story Version, Given a "No" Response to the Sense Question
Story Versions Kindergarten Third Grade
Trait, context, actions ( + + + )
all positive or or .00 .00
all negative ( - - - )
Trait and context ( + + - )
congruent; or .70 .87
action incongruent ( - - + )
Trait and action ( + - + )
congruent; or 1.00 1.00
context incongruent ( - + - )
Context and action ( + - - )
congruent; or 1.00 1.00
trait incongruent ( - + + )
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Table 9
Proportion of "Yes" Answers to the Question:
"Was there something you didn't expect?"
Story Versions Kindergarten Third Grade
Trait, context, actions ( + + + )
all positive or or .12 .34
all negative ( - - - )
Trait and context ( + + - )
congruent; or .47 .78
action incongruent ( - - + )
Trait and action ( + - + )
congruent; or .43 .84
context incongruent ( - + - )
Context and action ( +- - )
congruent; or .50 .72
trait incongruent ( - + + )
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Table 10
Conditional Probability of Citing Two Pieces of Contrasting Information
Given the Detection of "Unexpected" Information
Story Versions Kindergarten Third Grade
Trait, context, actions ( + + + )
all positive or or .00 .00
all negative ( - - - )
Trait and context ( + + - )
congruent; or .47 .76
context incongruent ( - - + )
Trait and action ( + - + )
congruent; or .29 .74
context incongruent ( - + - )
Context and action ( + - - )
congruent; or .50 .74
trait incongruent ( - + + )
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Table 11
Example of the Standard Version of the Secret Trip Story from the
Nezworski, Stein, and Trabasso (Note 3) Study
Category Type Story Statement
1. Once there were two kids named Peter
and Mary
2. who lived across the street from one
another.
Initiating Event
Internal Response
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Attempt
Consequence
One morning, Peter called Mary
and asked Mary to come over and play.
But Mary wanted to go shopping
and she didn't want to tell Peter where
she was going.
So Mary told Peter she was sick
and couldn't come over to play.
9. Then Mary went shopping
10. and bought a brand new skateboard.
11. Mary thought it was a really special toy
12. and was glad she had kept her shopping
trip a secret from Peter.
Reaction
Setting
--
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Table 12
Special Information Categories of the Secret Trip Story
from the Nezworski, Stein, and Trabasso (Note 3) Study
Category Type
Setting 1.
2.
Initiating Event
Internal Response
Story Statement Pair
The next day was Peter's birthday
and Mary always gave Peter a birthday
present.
1. Mary's friend told her that the next day
was Peter's birthday.
2. and that he might like a birthday
present.
1. Mary knew that the next day was Peter's
birthday
2. and she thought about a birthday present.
Consequence 1.
2.
Reaction
Mary gave Peter a birthday present
on the next day.
1. Mary was excited about giving Peter a
birthday present
2. on the next day.
__
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